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Researchers have recently designed a number of application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms that enable
applications to either be naturally resilient to errors or include additional detection and correction steps that
can bring the overall execution of an application back into an envelope for which an acceptable execution
is eventually guaranteed. A major challenge to building an application that leverages these mechanisms,
however, is to verify that the implementation satisfies the basic invariants that these mechanisms require—
given a model of how faults may manifest during the application’s execution.
To this end we present Leto, an SMT based automatic verification system that enables developers to verify
their applications with respect to a first-class execution model specification. Namely, Leto enables software
and platform developers to programmatically specify the execution semantics of the underlying hardware
system as well as verify assertions about the behavior of the application’s resulting execution. In this paper,
we present the Leto programming language and its corresponding verification system. We also demonstrate
Leto on several applications that leverage application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the aggressive scaling of technology sizes in modern computer processor fabrication, mod-
ern processors have become more vulnerable to errors that result from natural variations in pro-
cessor manufacturing, natural variations in transistor reliability as processors physically age over
time, and natural variations in these processors’ operating environments (e.g., temperature varia-
tion and cosmic/environmental radiation) [Amarasinghe et al. 2009; Borkar 2005; Johnston 2000;
Kurd et al. 2010; Mitra et al. 2005, 2006; Mukherjee et al. 2003; Shivakumar et al. 2002; Yim 2014].
Challenges. These systems encounter faults—anomalies in the underlying physical device—
that produce errors—unanticipated or incorrect values that are visible to the program. Simple fault
models include bit flips in the output of arithmetic, logical, and memory operations. These faults
can be transient—occurring nondeterministically with the device eventually returning to correct
behavior—or permanent—with the device never returning to correct behavior. A key challenge for
building applications for these platforms is that reasoning about the reliability of these programs
requires reasoning about the operation of the underlying execution model and its impact on the
application’s behavior.
1.1 Application-Specific Fault Tolerance
In response to this increased error vulnerability, researchers have begun to expand on historical re-
sults for algorithm-based fault tolerance [Bronevetsky and de Supinski 2008;Hoemmen and Heroux
2011; Huang and Abraham1984; Oboril et al. 2011; Roy-Chowdhury and Banerjee 1994, 1996; Sao et al.
2016; Sao and Vuduc 2013; Shantharam et al. 2012], alternatively application-specific fault tolerance,
to identify new opportunities for low-overhead mechanisms that can steer an application’s exe-
cution to produce acceptable results: results that are within some tolerance of the result expected
from a fully reliable execution. For example, application-specific fault tolerance techniques for
linear algebra produce lightweight checksums that developers can use to validate that the compu-
tation produced the correct results. For some applications, these checksums are exact, enabling the
exact error detection capabilities of dual-modular redundancy but with lower overhead. However,
for other applications, these checksums either are not known to exist or, at best, compromise on
their error coverage.
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Other techniques include selective n-modular redundancy in which a developer either man-
ually or with the support of a dynamic fault-injection tool identifies instructions or regions of
code that do not need to be protected for the application to produce an acceptable result—as
determined by an empirical evaluation [Carbin and Rinard 2010; Thomas and Pattabiraman 2016;
Venkatagiri et al. 2016; Vishal Chandra Sharma 2016]. Another class of techniques is fault-tolerant
algorithms that through the addition of algorithm-specific checking and correction code are toler-
ant to faults [Du et al. 2012; Hoemmen and Heroux 2011; Sao et al. 2016; Sao and Vuduc 2013].
Challenges. A major barrier to implementing these techniques is that their results either rely
on empirical guarantees or—for self-stabilizing algorithms—hinge on the assumption that the fault
model of the underlying computing substrate matches the assumptions of the algorithmic formal-
ization.
1.2 Verified Application-Specific Fault Tolerance
To address these challenges we present Leto, an SMT based, automatic verification system that
supports reasoning about unreliably executed programs. Leto enables a developer to verify their
application-specific fault tolerance mechanism by providing tools to 1) programmatically spec-
ify the behavior of the computing substrate’s fault model and 2) verify relational assertions that
relate the behavior of the unreliably executed program to that of the reliable execution. Specifi-
cally, Leto automatically weaves the behavior of the underlying hardware system—as given by a
specification—into the execution of the main program. In addition, Leto’s program logic enables
a developer to specify relational assertions that, for example, constrain the difference in results of
the unreliable execution of the program from that of its reliable execution.
1.2.1 First-Class ExecutionModels. Leto permits developers to programmatically specify a state-
ful execution model. Figure 1 presents a Leto specification for a first-class single-event upset (SEU)
execution model with specifications for multiplication. An SEU model is a common fault model
that application developers in the area of fault tolerance use to model the execution behavior of
an application such that they can provide a variety of fault tolerancemechanisms [Chen et al. 2008;
Yim et al. 2010]. The underlying assumption is that faults in a system (e.g., those due to cosmic ra-
diation) occur with a probability such that at most one fault will occur during the execution of an
application.
1 bool upset = false;
2
3 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
4 ensures (result == x1 * x2);
5
6 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
7 when (!upset)
8 modifies (upset)
9 ensures (upset);
Fig. 1. Unbounded SEU Execution Model
The model exports two versions of the multiplica-
tion operator. Line 3 specifies the standard reliable
implementation of multiplication. The model denotes
this fact with its ensures clause which asserts what
must be true of the model’s state and outputs after ex-
ecution of the operation. This operation specifically
constrains the value of result—which represents the
result of the operation—to equal x1 * x2where * has
standard multiplication semantics.
Line 6 specifies an unreliable implementation of
the multiplication operator. This implementation does not place any constraints on result and
therefore permits unbounded errors.
Stateful. Because the model is an SEU model it must track whether a fault has occurred so
that the model exposes at most one fault to the application. This model is therefore stateful and to
achieve this semantics, the model includes a boolean valued state variable—upset (Line 1)—that
records whether or not a fault has already occurred during the execution of the program. The
model additionally predicates the availability of its unreliable operations by a guard. Specifically,
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an operation’s guard is the optionally-specified boolean expression that occurs after the when key-
word. The when clause for the unreliable version requires !upset indicating that the unreliable
version is only enabled if a fault has yet to occur. Leto models the dynamic execution of the appli-
cation such that the execution exposes only enabled operation implementations at a given program
point.
1.2.2 Acceptability Properties. Leto enables developers to automatically verify the basic goal of
an application-specific fault tolerance mechanism: ensure that the resulting application satisfies
its acceptability properties [Carbin et al. 2012], such as its safety and accuracy.
Safety Properties: standard properties of the execution of the application that must be true
of a single execution of the application. Such properties include, for example, memory safety and
the assertion that the application returns results that are within some range. For example, a com-
putation of a distance metric must—regardless of the accuracy of its results—return a value that is
non-negative. In Leto, a developer specifies safety properties with the standard assert statements
typically seen in verification systems.
Accuracy Properties: properties of the unreliable or relaxed execution of the application that
relate its behavior and results to that of a reliably executed version. Accuracy properties are rela-
tional in that they relate values of the state of the program between its two semantic interpretations.
For example, the assertion abs(x<o> - x<r>) < epsilon in Leto specifies that the difference
in value of x between the program’s original, reliable execution (denoted by x<o>) and relaxed
execution (denoted by x<r>) is at most epsilon.
Execution-SpecificProperties. Given a first-class executionmodel, Leto also enables develop-
ers to refer to the state of the execution. For example, in many self-stabilizing iterative algorithms,
the proof of convergence for the algorithm in the presence of faults requires reasoning about three
cases: 1) the portion of the execution in which no fault has occurred, 2) the iteration on which a
fault occurs (assuming an SEU model), and 3) the portion of the execution after the fault. Leto en-
ables developers to verify such properties by exposing the state of the fault model into the program
logic.
Asymmetric Relational Verification. Leto provides and implements an Asymmetric Rela-
tional Hoare Logic [Carbin et al. 2012] as its core program logic. An Asymmetric Relational Hoare
Logic is a variant of the standard Hoare Logic that natively refers to the values of variables be-
tween two executions of the program. Leto’s use of a relational program logic serves two goals: 1)
it gives a semantics to accuracy properties and 2) it enables tractable verification of safety prop-
erties. For example, proving the memory safety of an application outright can be challenging for
many applications. However, application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms can typically be de-
signed and deployed such that it is possible to verify that for any given array access or memory
access, errors in the application do not interferewith the accessed address. Such properties are typ-
ically easier to verify for a protected application than verifying the safety of the memory access
outright. Leto therefore enables developers to tractably verify a strong relative safety guarantee:
if the original application satisfies all of the specified safety properties, then relaxed executions
of the application with its deployed application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms also satisfy
these safety properties.
1.3 Contributions
This paper presents the following contributions:
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First-Class Execution Models. We present a language for specifying execution models that
provides stateful, input-dependent selection of each operation’s implementation. We demonstrate
numerous sample execution models.
ExecutionModel Refinement. We present a language construct for refining models into new
models, permitting developers to create submodels that satisfy the specification of their supermod-
els. We describe the process by which refinement creates an interface between hardware vendors
and software developers.
Programming Language and Semantics. We present language constructs that enable the
developers to specify assertions that refer to the state of the execution model. These constructs
enable a developer to, for example, specify the precise properties that self-stabilizing applications
require to verify high-level convergence properties.
ProgramLogic andVerificationAlgorithm. Leto’s program logic enables developers to lower
the overhead of verifying a standard safety property by enabling techniques that demonstrate the
non-interference between the application’s faults and the validity of a property. Leto’s verification
algorithm additionally automates this process through the inclusion of loop invariant inference .
Case Studies. We evaluate Leto on several self-correcting algorithms (Jacobi, Self-stabilizing
ConjugateGradient, Self-stabilizing Steepest Descent, and Self-correctingConnectedComponents)
and demonstrate that it is possible to verify the key invariants required to prove that these algo-
rithms’ self-stability guarantees hold for their implementations. We consider execution models
that capture a range of substrates, including emerging hardware systems that bound potential er-
ror, emerging hardware security vulnerabilities (Rowhammer [Kim et al. 2014]), as well as standard
fault modelling assumptions that expose unbounded errors to the application.
Leto’s contributions enable developers to specify and verify the rich properties seen in applica-
tions with application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms.
2 EXAMPLE EXECUTION MODELS
1 vector <real> product(uint N,
2 vector <real > x(N),
3 vector <real > y(N))
4 {
5 vector <real> result(N);
6
7 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
8 {
9 result[i] = x[i] * y[i];
10 }
11 return result;
12 }
Fig. 2. Vector Product
Figure 2 presents an implementation of a
vector-vector product in Leto. It defines a
function product that takes a size param-
eter N, a vector x of size N, a vector y of
size N, and returns the element-wise prod-
uct of x and y.
In Section 2.1 through Section 2.3 we
introduce several execution models. We
highlight the key features of Leto that
these models use and demonstrate them
on variants of the vector product function.
We use this specific example because vector products are a component of many numerical algo-
rithms and exist in three of our four benchmarks as an intermediate calculation in matrix-vector
products.
In Section 2.4 we present a technique in Leto for refining loosely defined models into stricter
models. This technique ensures that these refined submodels satisfy the specifications of their
respective supermodels.
2.1 Additive Single-Event Upset ExecutionModel
The additive single-event upset execution model in Figure 3 exports two versions of the multiplica-
tion operator. Line 4 specifies the standard reliable implementation of multiplication. The model
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denotes this fact with its ensures clause which asserts what must be true of the model’s state
and outputs after execution of the operation. This operation specifically constrains the value of
result—which represents the result of the operation—to equal x1 * x2.
1 const real eps = ...;
2 bool upset = false;
3
4 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
5 ensures (result == x1 * x2);
6
7 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
8 when !upset
9 modifies (upset)
10 ensures upset &&
11 x1*x2 -eps < result < x1*x2+eps;
Fig. 3. Additive SEU Execution Model
Bounded Error. Leto enables developers
to place bounds on the results of binary oper-
ations by using inequalities over the result
variable. In addition, Line 7 specifies an un-
reliable implementation for multiplication.
The semantics of this unreliable operator
guarantees that even in the presence of an
error, the result is within eps of the original
result where eps is a programmer specified
constant in the model on Line 1.
2.1.1 Vector Product Under Additive SEU. Figure 4 presents a vector product implementation
annotated to verify under the additive SEU execution model. All of the relaxation in this implemen-
tation occurs in the loop (Line 9) where the execution model may corrupt the value of result[i].
On Line 15 the implementation uses a relational assertion (assert_r) to verify that model.eps
bounds the impact of these errors (Line 2). The notation model.eps is a first-class reference to the
state of the execution model at that point in the program.
Verifying this vector product implementation relies on Leto’s specification capabilities to estab-
lish bounds on the error in the product. Leto’s two features that diverge from traditional program-
ming languages are that developers can specify that some operations in the program may execute
with an alternative semantics and—as consequence—write relational assertions that relate values
between the standard, original execution and the alternative relaxed execution of the program.
Relaxed Execution. Leto exports custom operations by enabling developers to specify that an
operation may execute according to the execution model specification (versus a standard imple-
mentation) by appending a dot to the operation as in the operation ‘*.’ (Line 12).
Bounded Error. Many self healing iterative algorithms for solving linear systems of equations
experience increases in solve times proportional to the magnitude of errors they experience during
1 property_r bounded_diff (vector <real> x, uint N) :
2 ∀(uint i)((i < N<r>) -> (abs(x<o>[i] - x<r>[i]) < model.eps));
3
4 requires_r eq(N) && eq(x) && eq(y)
5 vector <real> product(uint N, vector <real > x(N), vector <real > y(N))
6 {
7 vector <real > result(N);
8
9 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
10 invariant_r bounded_diff (result , i)
11 {
12 result[i] = x[i] *. y[i];
13 }
14
15 assert_r(bounded_diff (result , N));
16
17 return result;
18 }
Fig. 4. Vector Product Under Additive SEU
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execution. For example, the Jacobi iterative method has the property that the change in the number
of iterations to converge after an error is bounded logarithmically by the magnitude of the error.
Thus, by bounding the magnitude of errors, a developer using the Jacobi method can derive a static
bound on the maximum impact errors can have on convergence time.
To verify that this vector product implementation has bounded error the developer uses the
assert_r statement on Line 15 to assert bounded_diff(result, N). bounded_diff is a rela-
tional property application. A property is a hygienic macro to enable code reuse within loop in-
variants and assertions. We define the bounded_diff property on Line 1. This property takes a
vector x and a size N and enforces that for every index i, model.eps bounds the error in x[i].
x<o>[i] - x<r>[i] computes the error in x where x<o> refers to the value of x in the standard,
original execution of the program and x<r> refers to the value of x in the relaxed execution. To
facilitate the verification of this condition we also include it in the loop invariant on Line 9.
Another necessary component to verifying this assertion is that N, x, and y have the same values
in both the original and relaxed executions. The implementation enforces this property through
the relational function precondition (requires_r) on Line 4. Leto expands terms of the form eq(x)
to x<o> == x<r>.
2.1.2 Verification Algorithm. Leto provides an automated verification algorithm that performs
relational forward symbolic execution to discharge assertions in the program. Namely, Leto tra-
verses the program, building a logical characterization of the state of the program at each point
and verifies that the resulting logical formula ensures that a given assert or assert_r statement
is valid. This approach also works in concert with the developer’s specification annotations; these
include both function preconditions and loop invariants. Leto also provides support for automatic
loop invariant inference, which can lower the annotation burden of the developer by automatically
inferring additional loop invariants. In the vector product under additive SEU program Leto infers
eq(N), eq(x), eq(y) and i <= N, which is necessary to demonstrate that all of the vector accesses
are in bounds.
2.2 Switchable Rowhammer Model
1 const uint eps = ...;
2 bool reliable = false;
3
4 @region(unreliable )
5 write(uint dest , uint src)
6 ensures (dest == src);
7
8 @region(unreliable )
9 write(uint dest , uint src)
10 when (!reliable)
11 ensures (src + eps < dest);
Fig. 5. Switchable Rowhammer Model
We present the switchable rowhammer execution
model in Figure 5. This execution model simulates a
Rowhammer attack that allows an attacker to selec-
tively flip bits in DRAM by issuing frequent reads on
DRAM rows [Kim et al. 2014].
Unlike the models we have presented thus far, this
one enables developers to model memory errors. Ad-
ditionally, it enables switchability, permitting the pro-
gram to selectively disable errors to emulate selec-
tive Rowhammer protection techniques [Aweke et al.
2016].
Memory Regions. In addition to binary operators, Leto permits the specification of read and
write behavior. Read and write specifications contain an additional @region annotation allowing
developers to partition their program variables into multiple memory regions with differing read
and write characteristics.
Both operator specifications in Figure 5 govern writes to variables stored in the unreliable
memory region. When Leto encounters an expression of the form v = ewhere v is in the memory
region unreliable, Leto substitutes occurrences of dest in the model with v and occurrences of
src with e. Line 4 specifies a reliable write operator while Line 8 specifies a faulty write operator.
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1 property_r large_error (vector <uint > x, uint N) :
2 ∀(uint i)(i < N<r> -> (eq(x[i]) || model.eps * model.eps < x<r>[i]));
3
4 requires ∀(uint i)(x[i] < model.eps && y[i] < model.eps)
5 requires_r eq(N) && eq(x) && eq(y)
6 vector <uint> product(uint N, vector <uint > x(N), vector <uint > y(N))
7 {
8 @region(unreliable ) vector <uint > result(N);
9
10 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
11 invariant_r large_error (result , i)
12 {
13 result[i] = x[i] * y[i];
14 }
15
16 assert_r(large_error (result , N));
17
18 return result;
19 }
Fig. 6. Vector Product Under Switchable Rowhammer
The faulty write operator permits errors that are larger than eps, the result being that the system
stores an erroneous value in the variable represented by dest and subsequent reads of that variable
return the erroneous value.
Switchability. The reliableflagmodels the fact that it is possible to selectively enable Rowham-
mer protection techniques [Aweke et al. 2016] to trade performance for reliability. Specifically if
reliable is set to true, then the model does not generate errors. In addition to Rowhammer, this
model can simulate scenarios that selectively use ECC-protected caches [Alameldeen et al. 2011;
Kim et al. 2007; Yoon and Erez 2009] in conjunction with traditional caches.
2.2.1 Vector Product Under Switchable Rowhammer. Figure 6 presents a vector product imple-
mentation annotated to verify under the switchable rowhammer model. The relaxation in this im-
plementation occurs in the loop (Line 10) where faulty writes may corrupt the value of result[i].
On Line 16 the implementation verifies that the impact of errors is larger than model.eps * model.eps.
Memory Regions. Line 8 places the result vector in the unreliablememory region. Thus,
Leto will use the execution model specification of the write operator on Line 13.
Detectable Errors. In some systems, large errors are always detectable as they produce invalid
results that an application can easily check for. For example, in Self-Correcting Connected Com-
ponents (SC-CC) [Sao et al. 2016]—an iterative algorithm for computing the connected subgraphs
in a graph—a large error in the output vector produces references to nonexistent graph nodes.
Thus, SC-CC detects and corrects all large errors by scanning through the output vector after each
iteration for invalid entries and recomputing erroneous elements reliably.
The assertion on Line 16 uses the large_error property on Line 1 to enforce that the impact of
errors is sufficiency large to produce invalid values in result. The large_error property takes a
vector x and a size N and ensures that for every index i, x[i] is equal across both executions, or
x<r>[i] contains a trivially invalid value.
To support this, the function precondition on Line 4 mandates that every element of x and y
is bounded between 0 and model.eps. This ensures that any non-erroneous value in result<r>
is bounded between 0 and model.eps * model.eps. Therefore, if a program using this vector
product function scans for elements that are out of this bound it will detect all errors. Such a
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program could then correct these errors by setting the reliableflag in the switchable rowhammer
model to true and recomputing the erroneous elements.
2.3 Multicycle Error Model
Figure 7 presents a multicycle error execution model. A multicycle error is an error state in which
multiple consecutive instructions experience errors [Inoue et al. 2011]. This implementation per-
mits a single multicycle error and tracks the state of this error through the use of model variables
stuck and length. The stuck flag represents whether or not the system is currently experienc-
ing a multicycle fault while the length variable indicates how many instructions the fault will
continue for. We leave the length variable unbound, permitting the multicycle error to persist
for an arbitrary number of operations. This implementation is compatible with the vector product
implementation from the additive SEU example (Figure 3) and requires no modifications to verify.
Line 6 describes a reliable multiplication implementation that the model may use before the
fault occurs (!stuck) and after it ends (length == 0).
1 const real eps = ...;
2 bool stuck = false;
3 uint length;
4
5 @label(reliable)
6 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
7 when !stuck || length == 0
8 ensures result == x1 * x2;
9
10 @label(unreliable )
11 operator *(real x1 , real x2)
12 when length > 0
13 modifies (stuck , length)
14 ensures stuck &&
15 length == old(length) - 1 &&
16 x1*x2 -eps < result < x1*x2+eps;
Fig. 7. Multicycle Error Execution Model
Line 11 encodes an operator that the
model may use during, or to begin a multi-
cycle error. The model may substitute these
operators so long as a multicycle error has
not occurred and resolved before the current
instruction (length > 0). This operator sets
stuck, decrements length, and constrains
result to be within eps of the original re-
sult.
Together, these two operators ensure that
at some point the system may be stuck ex-
periencing faults on all multiplications, but
after length multiplications it will unstick
and execution will be reliable.
Temporal Variable References. To support more complex models than one can express with
boolean flags, Leto allows developers to differentiate between variable state before and after each
operation. By default, all variables in ensures clauses refer to their state after the operator executes.
However, by wrapping the variable in old() the wrapped variable will instead refer to its state
before the operator executes. Temporal variable references through the old keyword is in the spirit
of similar constructs in ESC/Java [Flanagan and Leino 2001], Spec# [Barnett et al. 2004], and many
other verification systems. The multicycle error model uses this feature to track the length of a
multicycle event on Line 15 by asserting that the length variable after the multiplication is one
less than its value prior to the multiplication.
Named Operators. To enable developers to refine models, Leto supports optional labels on op-
erators. Refinement is the process by which developers may create submodels that satisfy the spec-
ification of supermodels. It enables developers to construct a lattice of such models such that pro-
grams verified under an abstract executionmodel will also verify under specialized versions of that
model. Line 5 gives the reliable label to the first operator while Line 10 gives the unreliable
label to the second operator.
2.3.1 Vector Product Under Multicycle. Leto verifies the vector product implementation from
the additive SEU example (Figure 4) under this model with no modifications to the implementation
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thus demonstrating Leto’s high automatic reasoning power, as well as the modular characteristic
of Leto’s execution models.
2.4 Refinement
To enable an parallel development process in which developers may successively build their hard-
ware, models, and programs in tandem, Leto supports execution model refinement. Refinement
enables developers to construct a lattice of models such that more precise submodels satisfy the
specification of less precise supermodels.
By verifying refinement, Leto guarantees that programs verified under an abstract execution
model will also verify under specialized versions of that model. Therefore, refinement separates
model elaboration from program verification. That is, it provides an interface between hardware
vendors and software developers. Software developers may verify their programs under loosely
defined execution models, while hardware vendors may provide detailed models that are true to
the underlying semantics of their hardware. As long as software developers use Leto to verify that
these precise models refine their loose models, Leto guarantees that their programs will run as
expected on the hardware vendor’s product.
Figure 8 presents an SEU model refined from the multicycle model. Line 1 indicates that this
model is a refinement of the multicycle model. Leto supports multiple refinement, allowing sub-
models to refine any number of supermodels. Line 2 and Line 3 import the reliable and unreliable
operators from the multicycle model by name. This makes these operators available to the sub-
model. Developers may add additional operators by indicating that they refine a named operator
in each supermodel. Leto checks that this submodel operator refines each supermodel operator by
verifying that the when clause of the submodel operator logically implies the when clause of each su-
permodel operator and the ensures clause of the submodel operator logically implies the ensures
clause of each supermodel operator. Every additional operator in a submodel must explicitly re-
fine some named operator in each supermodel. When using multiple refinement, any imported
operators from one model must also explicitly refine an operator in every other supermodel.
1 refines multicycle ;
2 import multicycle .reliable;
3 import multicycle .unreliable ;
4
5 multicycle .length = 1;
Fig. 8. Refined SEU Model
Line 5 additionally sets the length variable in themul-
ticycle model to 1. When refining a model, the submodel
implicitly imports all variable declarations and initializa-
tions from the supermodel. The submodel may declare
and initialize variables in its own namespace, but it may
not modify the variable state of the supermodel with one
exception: submodels may initialize uninitialized vari-
ables in the supermodel. We enforce this constraint on model variables because Leto programs
may inspect, modify, and assert over model variables so there must be no statically discernible
difference between the submodel and the supermodel state to a program written with knowledge
of supermodel state variables.
Since Leto verifies that the refined SEUmodel refines the multicycle model, Leto guarantees that
the vector product implementation in Figure 4 verifies under the new refined SEU model without
any changes to the vector product implementation.
3 LANGUAGE
Figure 9 presents the core of Leto’s programming language. Leto provides a general-purpose im-
perative language that includes specification primitives (e.g., requires) in the spirit of ESC/-
Java [Flanagan and Leino 2001], Boogie [Barnett et al. 2005], Eiffel [Meyer 1992], and Spec# [Barnett et al.
2004] to support verifying applications.
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c ∈ constants, x ∈ variables, r ∈ memory regions
S → (@region r )? τ x | (@region r )? τ x (c+) | x = E
| S ; S | assume P | assert_r Pr | assert P
|if (B) { S } else { S } | while (B) I ∗ { S }
τ → int | real | bool
I → invariant P | invariant_r Pr
M → model { x∗ O+ } O → operator Op (τ x)+ C+
Op → ¬ | ¬. | ⊕ | ≺ | ⋄ | read | write
C → when P | ensures P | modifies x+
⋄ → ∧ | ∧ . | → | → . | . . .
≺ →< | < . | = | = . | . . .
⊕ → + | + . | × | × . | . . .
E → x | E ⊕ E | model.x | x[E]
Er → x<o> | x<r> | Er ⊕ Er
| x<o>[Er ] | x<r>[Er ] | E
B → true | false | E ≺ E
| B ⋄ B | f E∗ | ¬ B | ¬. B
P → ∀ x B | ∃ x B | B
Pr → true | false | Er ≺ Er | Pr ⋄ Pr
| ¬ Pr | ¬. Pr | ∀ x Pr | ∃ x Pr
Fig. 9. Language Syntax
Programs. A program consists of a sequence of statements S . Although we also support func-
tions, we elide them here.
Data Types. The language includes primitive data types (τ ) of (signed and unsigned) integers,
reals, and booleans as well as vectors/matrices of these types. A developer can use the @region r
annotation to state the variable is allocated in a named memory region, r , for which reads and
writes may have a custom semantics according to the execution model.
Expressions. Leto includes standard numerical operations, comparison, and logical expres-
sions, along with dotted notations (e.g., x +. y) that communicate that the operation may have a
custom semantics as specified in the execution model.
Memory Operations. Leto supports reads from and writes to variables, including values of
both primitive and array/matrix type. Reads and writes to variables allocated in a designated mem-
ory region operate with the semantics as given in the program’s execution model.
Assertions and Assumptions. Leto also enables developers to specify assertions and assump-
tions on the state of the program. Leto’s language includes both standard assert statements and
assume statements (with their traditional meaning). Each such statement can use a quantified
boolean expression, P , that quantifies over the value of variable (e.g., the index of an array/matrix).
A relational assertion statement, assert_r, uses a quantified relational boolean expression, Pr ,
that specifies a relationship between the original and relaxed executions to verify.
Control flow. Leto’s language includes standard control constructs, such as sequential compo-
sition, if statements, while, and for statements. For while and for statements, a developer can
specify loop invariants to support verification via the syntax invariant (unary loop invariant) and
invariant_r (relational loop invariant). A loop invariant specifies a property that must be true on
entry to the loop, as well as at the end of each loop iteration. Loop invariants are a key to verifying
applications that contain loops because automatically inferring loop invariants is undecidable in
general. Therefore, a developer may need to specify additional loop invariants when Leto’s loop
invariant inference procedure is insufficient.
Execution Model. An execution model M consists of a set of state variables x∗ and operation
specifications (O*). Each operation specification (O) specifies 1) the target operator for the specifi-
cation, 2) a list of variables as parameters to the specification, and 3) a set of clauses. A clause is
either a when clause, which guards the execution of the specificationwith a predicate P , an ensures
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clause, which establishes a relationship on the output of the specification given the inputs to the
specification and fault model’s state variables, or a modifies clause, that specifies which of the
model’s state variables changes as a result of using the operation. Predicates consist of standard op-
erations over standard expressions with the addition of the distinguished result variable, which
captures the result of the specification’s execution.
3.1 Dynamic Semantics
x ∈ Var
r ∈ Reg
n ∈ IntN
Exp → n | r ⊕ r
S → r = Exp | r = x | x = r
| assert r | assume r
| skip | S ; S | if r S S
| while r P∗r S
Fig. 10. Syntax of Lowered Language (Abbreviated)
We next present an abbreviated dynamic
semantics of Leto’s language. We expand
on these semantics inAppendix C andAppendix D.
We formalize the semantics via a lowered syn-
tax of the Leto language that includes registers
(Figure 10). We assume a standard compilation
process that translates high-level Leto to this
lowered language. Additionally, to support our formalization of Leto’s program logic on this rep-
resentation, we extend the predicates P and Pr with registers into P
∗ and P∗r , respectively.
3.1.1 Preliminaries. Leto’s semantics models an abstract machine that includes a frame, a heap,
and an execution model state. Leto allocates memory for program variables (both scalar and array)
in the heap. A frame serves two roles: 1) a frame maps a program variable to the address of the
memory region allocated for that variable in the heap, and 2) a frame maps a register to its current
value in the program. The model state stores the values for state variables within the execution
model.
Frames, Heaps, Model States, Environments. A frame, σ ∈ Σ = Var∪Reg → IntN, is a finite
map from variables and registers to N-bit integers. A heap, h ∈ H = Loc → IntN, is a finite map
from locations (n ∈ Loc ⊂ IntN) to N-bit integer values. A region map, θ ∈ Θ = Loc → Region, is a
finite map from locations to memory regions. A model state,m ∈ M = Var → IntN, is a finite map
frommodel state variables to N-bit integer values. An environment, ε ∈ E = Σ×H×Θ×M , is a tuple
consisting of a frame, a heap, a region map, and a model state. An execution model specification,
µ ⊆ Op × list(Var) × set(Var) × P × P , is a relation consisting of tuples of an operation op ∈ Op, a
list of input variables, a set of modified variables, and two unary logical predicates representing
the when and ensures clauses of the operation.
Initialization. For clarity of presentation, we assume a compilation and execution model in
which memory locations for program variables are allocated and the corresponding mapping in
the frame are done prior to execution of the program (similar in form to C-style declarations).
3.1.2 Execution Model Semantics. Here we provide an abbreviated presentation of the execu-
tion model relation 〈m, op, (args)〉 ⇓µ 〈n, m
′〉. The relation states that given the arguments, args
to an operation op, evaluation of the operation from the model statem yields a result n and a new
model statem′ under the execution model specification µ .
f-binop
µ(⊕, [x1, x2],X , Pw , Pe ) ∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m ) m[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2] |= Pw
m′[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2][∀xm ∈ X · xm 7→ x
′
m ][result 7→ n3] |= Pe dom(m) = dom(m
′)
〈m,⊕, (n1,n2)〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
The [f-binop] rule specifies the meaning of this relation for binary operations. This relation
states that the value of an operation ⊕ given a tuple of input values (n1,n2) and an execution
model state m evaluates to value n3 and a new model state m
′. The rule relies on the relation
µ(op,vlist,X , Pw , Pe )which specifies the list of argument names, vlist, the set of modified variables
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X , the precondition Pw , and the postcondition Pe for the operation op in the developer-provided
execution model. The set of modified variables is the union of the modifies clauses in the oper-
ation’s specification. The precondition of an operation is the conjunction of the when clauses in
the operation’s specification. The postcondition of an operation is the conjunction of the ensures
clauses in the operation’s specification.
The semantics of the model relation non-deterministically selects an operation specification,
result value, and output model state subject to the constraint that: 1) the current model state satis-
fies the precondition (after the inputs to the operation have been appropriately assigned into the
model state), 2) the output model state satisfies the postcondition (after the inputs, modified vari-
ables, and result value have been appropriately assigned into the model state), and 3) the domains
of the input and output state are the same.
Because of the uniformity of the execution model specification, the semantics for other opera-
tions (e.g., reads and writes) is similar with the sole distinction being the number of arguments
passed to the operation. For clarity of presentation, we elide the presentation of rules for those
operations, but we provide them in Appendix D, Figure 22.
3.1.3 Language Semantics. Wenext present the non-deterministic small-step transition relation
〈s, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s ′, ε ′〉 of a Leto program. The relation states that execution of statement s from the
environment ε takes one step yielding the statement s ′ and environment ε ′ under the execution
model specification µ . The semantics of the statements are largely similar to that of traditional
approaches except for the ability to the statements to encounter faults. Broadly, we categorize
Leto’s instructions into four categories: register instructions, assertions, memory instructions, and
control flow.
assign
〈r = n, 〈σ , h, θ , m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ [r 7→ n], h, θ , m〉〉
binop
n1 = σ (r1) n1 = σ (r2) 〈m, ⊕, (n1,n2)〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
〈r = r1 ⊕ r2, 〈σ , h, θ , m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈r = n3, 〈σ , h, θ , m
′〉〉
Register Instructions. The rules [assign] and [binop] specify the semantics of two of Leto’s
register manipulation instructions. [Assign] defines the semantics of assigning an integer value to
a register, r = n. This has the expected semantics updating the value of r within the current frame
with the value n. Of note is that register assignment executes fully reliably without faults.
[binop] specifies the semantics of a register only binary operation, r = r1 ⊕ r2. Note that reads
of the input registers execute fully reliably. The result of the operation is n3, which is the value
of the operation given the semantics of that operation’s execution model when executed from the
model state m on parameters n1 and n2. Executing the execution model may change the values
of the execution model’s state variables. Therefore, the instruction evaluates to an instruction
that assigns n3 to the destination register and evaluates with a environment that consists of the
unmodified frame, the unmodified heap, and the modified execution model state. Note that by
virtue of the fact that both the frame and heap are unmodified, faults in register instructions cannot
modify the contents or organization of memory.
Assertions. The assert and assume statements have standard semantics, yielding a skip and
continuing the execution of the program if their conditions are satisfied. For either of these state-
ments, if their conditions evaluate to false, then execution yields fail denoting that execution has
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failed and become stuck in error. We provide the rules for both assert and assume in Appendix C,
Figure 20.
read
a = σ (x) n = h(a) q = θ (a) 〈m, read, (n,q)〉 ⇓µ 〈n
′
, m′〉
〈r = x , 〈σ , h, θ , m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈r = n′, 〈σ , h, θ , m′〉〉
write
a = σ (x)
nold = h(a) nnew = σ (r ) q = θ (a) 〈m, write, (nold,nnew,q)〉 ⇓µ 〈nr , m
′〉
〈x = r , 〈σ , h, θ , m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ , h[a 7→ nr ], θ , m
′〉〉
Memory Instructions. The rules [read] and [write] specify the semantics of two of Leto’s
memory manipulation instructions. [read] defines the semantics of reading the value of a pro-
gram variable x from it’s corresponding memory location: r = x . The rule fetches the program
variable’s memory address from the frame, reads the value of the memory location n = h(a) and
the region the memory location belongs to q = θ (a) and then executes the execution model with
the program variable’s current value in memory and the memory region it resides in as a param-
eters. The execution model non-deterministically yields a result n′ that the rule uses to complete
its implementing by issuing an assignment to the register.
[write] defines the semantics of writing the value of a register to memory. The rule reads the
value of the memory location to record the old value of the memory location, reads the value of
the input register, fetches the region the memory location corresponds to, and then executes the
execution model with these values as parameters. The execution model yields a new value nr that
the rule then assigns to the value the program variable.
Control Flow. The rules for control flow have standard semantics. An important note is that
the semantics of these statements is such that the transfer of control from one instruction to an-
other always executes reliably and, therefore, faults do not introduce control flow errors into the
program. This modeling assumption is consistent with standard fault injection and reliability anal-
ysis models [Sampson et al. 2011; Vishal Chandra Sharma 2016]. We provide the control flow rules
in Appendix C, Figure 20.
Big-Step Semantics. To support the formalization in the remainder of the paper, we introduce
the big-step relation 〈s, ε〉 ⇓m v ⊆ S × E × V where V ::= E | fail E such that 〈s, ε〉 ⇓ v is the
reflexive transitive closure of→m that yields the environment ε if execution ends successfully in
a skip statement or yields the pair fail ε when the execution ends in a failure. We also introduce
the big-step relation 〈s, ε〉 ⇓ v ⊆ S × E ×V where 〈s, ε〉 ⇓ v ≡ 〈s, ε〉 ⇓ρ v where ρ denotes a fully
reliable fault model where the only implementations exposed for each operation are fully reliable
implementations.
4 PROGRAM LOGIC
Leto’s program logic is a relational program logic in that it relates relaxed executions of the pro-
gram to its original, reliable execution. A key idea behind our development is the separation of the
rules into a part that solely characterizes the reliable execution of the program, (the Left Rules), a
part that solely characterizes the relaxed execution (the Right Rules), and a part the characterizes
the lockstep execution of the reliable and relaxed execution (the Lockstep Rules). The result is an
Asymmetric Relational Hoare Logic that characterizes the two interpretations of the program.
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assign-l
⊢l { Q
∗
r [n/injo (r )] } r = n { Q
∗
r }
assign-r
µ ⊢r { Q
∗
r [n/injr (r )] } r = n { Q
∗
r }
binop-l
⊢l { Q
∗
r [injo (r1 ⊕ r2)/injo (r )] } r = r1 ⊕ r2 { Q
∗
r }
binop-r
fresh(r ′) ∃([x1, x2], X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) · injr (P
∗
w [r1/x1][r2/x2])
Q ′∗r =
©­«
∨
([x1,x2],X ,P
∗
w ,P
∗
e )∈µ(⊕)
injr (P
∗
w [r1/x1][r2/x2]) → injr (P
∗
e [r1/x1][r2/x2][∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m )/xm ][r
′/result])
ª®¬
µ ⊢r { Q
∗
r [injr (r
′)/injr (r )] ∧Q
′∗
r } r = r1 ⊕ r2 { Q
∗
r }
assert-l
⊢l { true } assert r { injo (r ) }
assert-r
µ ⊢r { injr (r ) } assert r { injr (r ) }
assume-l
⊢l { true } assume r { injo (r ) }
assume-r
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } assert r { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } assume r { Q
∗
r }
Fig. 11. Le and Right Rules for Primitive Statements
⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }
split
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s ∼ s { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }
seq
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s1 { R
∗
r } µ ⊢ { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s1 ; s2 { Q
∗
r }
if
b ≡ r = true µ ⊢ { P∗r ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s1 { Q
∗
r } µ ⊢ { P
∗
r ∧ ¬injo (b) ∧ injr (b) } s2 ∼r s1 { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢ { P∗r ∧ injo (b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s1 ∼r s2 { Q
∗
r } µ ⊢ { P
∗
r ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s2 { Q
∗
r }
⊢ { P∗r } if r s1 s2 { Q
∗
r }
Fig. 12. Lockstep Control Flow and Structural Rules
4.1 Preliminaries
Assertion Logic Syntax and Semantics. Figure 9 presents our language syntax, including
the syntax of our assertion language. Assertions include standard quantified boolean predicates,
P∗, with the standard semantic function JP∗K ∈ P(E) that gives the denotation of P∗ as the set
of environments that satisfy the predicate. Assertions also include quantified relational boolean
predicates, P∗r , with the semantic function JP
∗
r K ∈ P(E× E) that gives P
∗
r the meaning of the set of
pairs of environments that satisfy the predicate. In our standard convention, the first environment
of the pair corresponds to the state of the reliable execution whereas the second environment
corresponds to that of the relaxed execution.
Auxiliary Definitions. To support the formalization in the remainder of the paper we define
the auxiliary notation injt (·)where t ∈ {o, r } implements an injection for standard unary predicates
into a relational domain. For t = o, the definition injects a predicate into the domain of the reliable
execution of the program whereas when t = r , the definition injects a predicate into the domain
of the relaxed execution.
4.2 Proof Rules
Figures 11 and 12 provide an abbreviated presentation of the rules of our program logic.We present
the remainder of the rules in Appendix A. We have partitioned the presentation into two parts: 1)
the Left Rules and Right Rules for primitive statements and 2) the Lockstep Rules.
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Left Rules. The Left Rules, which we denote by the judgment ⊢l { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }, characterize
the behavior of the reliable execution of the statement s . The denotation of the judgment is that
if (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r , and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1, then (ε
′
1, ε2) |= Q
∗
r . Namely, given a proof in the Left Rules, for
a pair of environments satisfying the precondition of the proof, then if a reliable execution of s
terminates, then the resulting environment pair satisfies the proof’s postcondition.
Right Rules. The right rules, which we denote by the judgment µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }, character-
ize the behavior of the relaxed execution of s under a fault model specification µ . The denotation
of the judgment is similar to that of the Left Rules: if (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r , 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then (ε1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r .
Namely, given a proof in the right rules, for a pair of environments satisfying the proof’s precon-
dition, then if execution of s under the fault model specification µ terminates, then the resulting
environment pair satisfies the proof’s postcondition.
Lockstep Rules. The Lockstep Rules together constitute the main top-level judgment of the
logic reasons about relations between the two semantics as they proceed in lockstep.: µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }.
The denotation is that if (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r , 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1, and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then (ε
′
1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r .
4.2.1 Le and Right Rules.
Register Assignment. The rules [assign-l] and [assign-r] capture the semantics of the regis-
ter assignment statement, r = n in the lowered language. In the reliable execution, the rule [assign-
l] captures the semantics of the assignment statement via the standard backward characterization
of assignment as seen in standard Hoare logic [Hoare 1969]. The major distinction between a stan-
dard presentation and the presentation here is that the substitution replaces the injected form of
the register r in the postcondition of the statement. The expression injo(r ) denotes the value of
r in the reliable version of the program. For the relaxed execution, the rule [assign-r] captures
the semantics by substituting for injr (r ), which denotes the value of r in the relaxed execution.
We note that given these results, assignment is reliable in both the reliable and relaxed executions
with the primary distinction being which environment is modified (either that corresponding to
the reliable execution or that of the relaxed execution).
Arithmetic Operation. The rules [binop-l] and [binop-r] give the semantics of binary arith-
metic operations on registers: r = r1 ⊕ r2. For the reliable execution, [binop-l] relies on the back-
wards characterization of assignment as seen in [assign-l] to substitute the value r in the reliable
execution of the program with the value of the arithmetic operation injo(r1 ⊕ r2). For the relaxed
execution, [binop-r], augments the traditional backwards characterization to include the poten-
tially unreliable execution of the binary operation.
Assert. The rules [assert-l] and [assert-r] give the semantics of assertion statements. There
is a major distinction between the role of assertion statements between the reliable and relaxed
execution of the program. Specifically, while the logic requires that the condition of an assert
statement is verified in the relaxed execution, the condition of an assert statement in the reliable
execution does not need to be verified; it is instead assumed. The major design point is that Leto
enables a developer to use a variety of means (e.g., testing, verification, or code review) to vali-
date an assertion in the original program and transfer that reasoning to the verification process
for the relaxed execution. To achieve this design, the Left rule for assertions assumes the validity
of the assertion whereas the Right rule asserts. Although the assert and assume have the same
semantics in the reliable and relaxed executions, the intentions of the statements differ. Specifi-
cally, if a developer places an assert in the program, the assumption is that they have used other
means to evaluate the validity of that assertion in the reliable execution (potentially including
other verification systems). An assume statement, however, does not carry that intention.
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Assume. The rules [assume-l] and [assume-r] give the semantics of assume statements. The
primary distinction for assume statements is that while assume statements have their standard
semantics in the reliable execution of the program (no proof obligation is required), assume state-
ments do in fact require a proof obligation in the relaxed semantics. The semantics of an assume
statement in the relaxed semantics is therefore the same as that of an assert statement. The ratio-
nale behind this design is that as part of the verification of the relaxed execution we must verify
that faults do not interfere with the reasoning behind an assumption.
Control Flow. For clarity of presentation we have elided the left and right rules control flow
because the rules adhere to the standard formalization as seen in traditional Hoare logic. The
only distinction between these rules and their standard implementation is that they operate over
relational predicates.
4.2.2 Lockstep Rules. To support the lock step rules, we first present the [stage] rule, which
joins the Left Rules and Right Rules.
stage
⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } µ ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s1 ∼ s2 { Q
∗
r }
inverse-stage
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s2 { R
∗
r } ⊢l { R
∗
r } s1 { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s1 ∼r s2 { Q
∗
r }
Stage. The rule [stage] gives a semantics to a pair of statements s1 and s2 for which the goal
is to characterize the behavior when the reliable execution executes s1 and the relaxed execution
executes s2. The specific composition we have chosen for this rule is to apply the Left Rules for s1
before applying the Right Rules to s2. Namely, the rule first applies the Left Rule for s1, yielding
a new predicate R∗r , before then applying the Right Rule for s2 to R
∗
r . The rule [split] provides
a rationale for this specific composition. The rule [inverse-stage] has the opposite semantics,
applying the Right Rule for s2, yielding a new predicate R
∗
r , before then applying the Left Rule for
s1 to R
∗
r . The rule [if] provides a rationale for this composition during nonlockstep execution.
Split. The rule [split] gives a semantics to individual statements in the lockstep semantics. The
rule relies on the [stage] rule to apply the left rules for the statement before applying the right
rules. This design forces a specific composition of the rules in order to achieve more tractable veri-
fication. For example, for a statement assert r , this rule will first apply the left rule for assertions,
which can be used to derive r<o> = true . Note that this derivation occurs by assumption as the
logic assumes the validity of assertions in the reliable execution. Next, the rule requires the proof
to establish that r<r> = true . If, for example, the predicate r<o> = r<r> is in the context, then this
proof obligation is easily established.
If. The rule [if] gives the semantics of if statements. The rule considers all cases of the execu-
tion of the statement. Specifically, the reliable and relaxed executions may proceed in lockstep or
they may diverge by proceeding down different branches. The logic captures this divergence by
leveraging the inverse staging rule to apply the Right Rules for the branch on which the relaxed
execution has taken before applying the Left Rules for the one which the reliable version has taken.
Again, this forces a specific methodology for reasoning about the programs in that the logic ex-
tracts the full availability of assertions that may exist on the branch that the relaxed execution
takes before proceeding with the reliable execution.
4.3 Properties
Leto’s program logic ensures two basic properties of Leto programs: preservation and progress.
The preservation property states the partial correctness of the logic (but does not not establish
termination—and therefore total correctness). The progress property establishes that the relaxed
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execution of a program verified with Leto satisfies all of its assert and assume statements—
provided that all reliable executions of the program also satisfy the program’s assert and assume
statements. We state these properties formally below and provide proofs of these theorems in
Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1 (Preservation).
If µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1 and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then (ε
′
1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r
Leto’s preservation property states that given a proof in the program logic of a program s , for
all pairs of environments (ε1, ε2) that satisfy the proof’s precondition, if the executions of s under
both the reliable semantics and the relaxed semantics terminate in a pair of environments (ε ′1, ε
′
2),
then this pair of environments satisfies the proof’s postcondition.
Theorem 4.2 (Progress).
If µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1 and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ v2, then ¬failed(v2) where
failed(〈fail, ε〉) = true
Leto’s progress property states that given a proof in the program logic of a program s , for all
pairs of environments (ε1, ε2) that satisfy the proof’s precondition, if the reliable execution of s
terminates successfully, then if the relaxed execution of s under µ terminates, then it does not
terminate in an error.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Leto’s verification algorithm performs forward symbolic execution to discharge verification con-
ditions generated by assert, assert_t, invariant, and invariant_r statements in the program.
The algorithm directly implements the Hoare-style relational program logic from Section 4. We
present a detailed description of the algorithm in Appendix E. We also present a description of
our loop invariant inference algorithm in Appendix F. The inference algorithm is modeled after
Houdini [Flanagan and Leino 2001], and its base design is to infer common equivalence relations
between programs.
Leto generates constraints to be solved by Microsoft’s Z3 SMT solver [De Moura and Bjørner
2008]. Our system makes use of Z3’s real, int, and bool types as well as uninterpreted functions for
arrays/matrices. As such, our system does not necessarily generate a set of constraints for which
Z3 is complete. The practical impact of this design is that it is possible for Z3 to be unable to
verify valid constraints. However, we have been able to successfully verify critical fault tolerance
properties for several applications as presented in the following section.
6 CASE STUDY: JACOBI ITERATIVE METHOD
Figure 14 presents an implementation of the Jacobi iterative method, alternatively Jacobi, in Leto.
The Jacobi iterative method is an algorithm for solving a system of linear equations. Specifically,
given a matrix of coefficients A and a vector b of intercepts, the algorithm computes a solution
vector, x, where A∗x = b. The algorithmworks iteratively by computing successive approximations
of x. For a system of two equations (where A is a 2x2 matrix and both b and x are of length two),
Jacobi uses the solution vector from the previous iteration, xk , to produce the solution vector for
the current iteration, xk+1, using the following approximation scheme:
xk+10 = (b0 −A0,1 · x
k
1 )/A0,0
xk+11 = (b1 −A1,0 · x
k
0 )/A1,1
In words, for a given coordinate xi , Jacobi approximates x
k+1
i , by substituting the values x
k
j , where
i , j , into the linear equation for i , and solving for xk+1i .
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Modulo floating-point rounding error, Jacobi converges to the correct x as the number of itera-
tions goes to infinity.
Fault Tolerance. Jacobi is naturally self-stabilizing. Specifically, given an execution platform
in which faults do not modify the contents of A, then Jacobi is in a valid state at the end of each
iteration: if no additional faults occur during its execution, then Jacobi will converge to the correct
solution.
To understand this property intuitively, if an iteration produces an incorrect solution vector,
then the subsequent execution of the computation is equivalent to having started the computation
from scratch with the produced vector as the initial starting point. Moreover, Jacobi enjoys the
nice result that the change in the number of iterations required to converge from the new starting
point is bounded logarithmically by the magnitude of the error in the solution vector.
Verifying Jacobi for a given execution platform therefore poses two challenges: 1) verifying that
faults only affect the value of x and 2) identifying a bound on the number of added iterations in the
presence of a fault. Note that the latter determination not only serves as important information
for understanding if the implementation will meet the developer’s convergence requirements, but
it also serves the practical purpose of setting the maximum number of iterations such that a faulty
execution will produce a result that is at least as good as a fully reliable execution.
6.1 Multiplicative Single Event Upset Model
1 const real E_REL = ...;
2 bool upset = false;
3
4 operator *(real x1, real x2)
5 ensures (result == x1 * x2);
6
7 operator *(real x1, real x2)
8 when !upset && (0 < x1 * x2)
9 modifies (upset)
10 ensures upset &&
11 ((1 - E_REL) * x1 * x2 <=
12 result <=
13 (1 + E_REL) * x1 * x2);
14
15 operator *(real x1, real x2)
16 when !upset && (x1 * x2 < 0)
17 modifies (upset)
18 ensures upset &&
19 ((1 + E_REL) * x1 * x2 <=
20 result <=
21 (1 - E_REL) * x1 * x2);
Fig. 13. Multiplicative SEU Execution Model
We verify Jacobi under the multiplicative
SEU model we present in Figure 13. The
model exports three versions of the multi-
plication operator. Line 4 specifies the stan-
dard reliable implementation of multipli-
cation. Line 7 and Line 15 each addition-
ally specify an unreliable implementation
for the case where x1 * x2 is positive
or negative respectively. Each implementa-
tion models potentially unreliable multipli-
ers that are protected by truncated error
correction [Sullivan and Swartzlander 2012,
2013]. Specifically, the semantics of each un-
reliable version provides the guarantee that
even in the presence of an error, the result
differs by at most E_REL*100% of the orig-
inal result [Sullivan and Swartzlander 2012,
2013], where E_REL is a constant the model
specifies on Line 1.
6.2 Jacobi Implementation
The overall architecture of the implementation in Figure 14 is that the outer loop on Line 4 com-
putes and stores the solution vector for the current iteration into next_x. At the end of each
iteration, the implementation updates x by copying next_x into x. The second loop on Line 8 it-
erates through each xi (stored at x[i]), sums the other terms in the ith equation using the thrid
loop (Line 14) into sum, and then computes x[i] as the value b[i] - sum/A[i][i]. We discuss
the definitions of the properties sig and bounded_diff below.
All of the relaxation in Jacobi occurs in the third loop (Line 14), where the execution model may
corrupt the value of sum. The implementation first performs a relaxed multiplication (Line 17),
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1 uint N; int iters;
2 matrix <real> A(N,N); vector <real > b(N); vector <real > x(N)
3
4 for ( ; 0 <= iters; --iters) invariant_r !model.upset -> eq(x)
5 {
6 vector <real > next_x(N);
7
8 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
9 invariant_r !model.upset -> eq(next_x)
10 invariant_r bounded_diff (N, next_x)
11 {
12 real sum = 0;
13
14 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j) invariant_r sig(sum)
15 {
16 if (i != j) {
17 real delta = A[i][j] *. x[j];
18
19 if (E/model.E_REL -E <= abs(delta)) {
20 delta = A[i][j] * x[j];
21 }
22 }
23
24 sum = sum + delta;
25 }
26 real num = b[i] - sum;
27 next_x[i] = num / A[i][i];
28 }
29
30 x = next_x;
31
32 assert_r eq(A);
33 assert_r(bounded_diff (N, x));
34 }
Fig. 14. Jacobi Iterative Method.
then dynamically checks that the error in this multiplication could not have exceeded the statically
set bound E given a relative error with a maximum percentage deviation from the correct value
of model.E_REL (Line 19). The notation model.E_REL is a first-class reference to the state of the
execution model at that point in the program. If the value of abs(A[i][j] * x[j]) is less than
E / model.E_REL, then a relative error cannot exceed the magnitude of the absolute error bound
E because the quantity A[i][j] * x[j] is small. However, checking this property requires the
use of a reliable multiplication, so we instead perform a relaxed multiplication and conservatively
approximate this property by instead checking that abs(delta) is less than E/model.E_REL -
E. If it was possible for an error to exceed this bound, the algorithm repeats the multiplication
reliably (Line 20).
6.3 Specification
The verified Jacobi implementation relies on Leto’s specification capabilities to establish self-stability
and verify a convergence bound.
Self-Stability. To verify that this Jacobi implementation is self-stabilizing the developer uses
the assert_r statement on Line 32 to assert eq(A), which denotes that A has the same value in
both the original and relaxed execution.
This property therefore asserts that faults do not disturb the matrix of coefficients and therefore
precludes any execution models that may disturb the contents of A.
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Convergence Bound. Jacobi also enjoys a bound on the additional number of iterations added
to its execution given a fault. Specifically, ∆c = O(logT (
1
(N×EPS)2
)) where ∆c is the number of
additional iterations in the relaxed execution, N is the size of the x vector, EPS is the maximum
perturbation in each element of the solution vector to due a fault in an iteration, and T is a value
between 0 and 1 representing the magnitude of the non-diagonal elements of A relative to the
magnitude of the diagonal elements of A. We specify that the maximum perturbation is bounded
by EPS with the assert_r on Line 33, which asserts that bounded_diff(N, x). The property
bounded_diff states that if an upset occurs during an execution of the outer loop, then the error
in each element of x is bounded. For clarity of presentation, we elide the full specification of
bounded_diff.
6.4 Verification Approach
To verify Jacobi, the developer needs to provide a set of loop invariants that structure the proof.
Outer Loop. The outermost loop on Line 4 has a single invariant specified by the developer:
!model.upset -> eq(x). Given our target execution model in Figure 13, this invariant therefore
states that if a fault has yet to occur, then x is equivalent between both the original and relaxed
executions. This invariant follows because in the absence of a fault, Jacobi is a deterministic compu-
tation for which any two executions (the original and relaxed execution) that start from the same
state compute the same result. By default, Leto models the two executions as starting from the
same state. Therefore, all variables initialized in Line 1 and Line 2 have the same values between
the two executions.
Middle Loop. The middle loop on Line 8 of has two developer-specified invariants. The first
invariant states the behavior of the loop if a fault has yet to occur in the program. In this case,
next_x is the same in both the original and relaxed executions (i.e., eq(next_x)).
The second invariant is a key step towards one main proof goal: bounded_diff(N, next_x),
which states that if no fault has occurred previously, then the error in each position of next_x is
bounded if a fault occurs on this iteration. Because the next step of the algorithm directly assigns
next_x to x, this must be an invariant of the middle loop.
Inner Loop. The second invariant of the middle loop is critical for verifying the innermost loop.
The invariant sig(sum) verifies that if an error occurs on this inner loop iteration, then sum<r> is
within E of sum<o>. Otherwise, eq(sum). This property is true because if a fault did not occur on
the previous calculation of x in the outer loops (as provided by the third invariant of the middle
loop) then at most one fault may happen during the calculation of each delta that contributes to
sum and the error in each delta is bounded by E. Leto verifies that the unreliable multiplication
in combination with the conservative check on Line 19 establishes this fact.
7 EVALUATION
We next present our results from using Leto to implement and verify several self-stabilizing and
self-correcting algorithms.
7.1 Benchmarks and Properties
Figure 15 presents for each benchmark (Column 1) the execution model we verified under (Column
2), and the number of lines of code it contains (Column 3).
Jacobi Iterative Method. We verify the Jacobi benchmark as presented in Section 6 under a
multiplicative (SEU) error model (Figure 13).
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Benchmark Execution Model LOC Manual Annotations Invariants Inferred
Jacobi Multiplicative SEU 51 16 30
SS-CG Additive SEU 167 22 36
SS-SD Unbounded SEU 57 9 0
SC-CC Switchable Rowhammer 89 38 42
Fig. 15. Benchmark Verification Effort
Benchmark Time (s) Memory Usage (kbytes) Constraints Generated
Jacobi 37.79 36132 12473
SS-CG 4.24 37836 11707
SS-SD 0.19 25440 420
SC-CC 158.77 199428 4200
Fig. 16. Benchmark Runtime Characteristics
Self-Stabilizing Steepest Descent (SS-SD). SS-SD is another iterative linear system of equa-
tions solver that employs a periodic, reliable correction step [Sao and Vuduc 2013] to repair the
state of the program.We verify that a developer can correctly implement the correction step using
instruction duplication (i.e., dual modular redundancy (DMR)) under an unbounded SEU execution
model (Figure 1). We present the full benchmark in Appendix I.
Self-StabilizingConjugateGradientDescent (SS-CG). SS-CG is an iterative linear system of
equations solver that employs a periodic, reliable correction step to repair the program state in the
presence of faults [Sao and Vuduc 2013]. We verify under an additive SEU error model (Figure 3)
that errors are sufficiently small such that the algorithm does not diverge. We also verify that
the correction step can be correctly implemented using instruction duplication. We present a full
description of the SS-CG in Appendix H.
Self-CorrectingConnected-Components (SC-CC). SC-CC is an iterative algorithm for com-
puting the connected subgraphs in a graph where each iteration consists of a faulty initial compu-
tation step followed by a correction step [Sao et al. 2016]. We verify that each iteration computes
the correct result under a Rowhammer [Kim et al. 2014] error model that allows for an unbounded
number of faulty writes to storage. We specifically verify that the implementation detects and
corrects all errors. We present the full benchmark in Appendix G.
7.2 Verification Effort
Figure 15 also presents the annotation burden Leto imposes on the programmer. For each bench-
mark, we present the number of manual annotations (Column 4) and the number of automatically
inferred loop invariants (Column 5). Manual annotations include loop invariants, assertions, and
function requirements. We consider each conjunct a separate annotation when counting inferred
invariants and manual annotations.
Results. We significantly reduce the number of invariants we must provide using inference in
all but one benchmark. In half of the cases we infer more invariants than we provide. We infer
no invariants for SS-SD as Z3 very quickly runs out of memory on our machine and therefore we
must disable inference on all loops in that benchmark. We believe that we could resolve this issue
by monitoring the memory usage of the Z3 subprocess, killing the process if it consumes too much,
and falling back on our weak inference algorithm.
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Runtime Characteristics. Figure 16 presents also the runtime performance characteristics
of the Leto C++ implementation. We ran our experiments on an Intel i5-5200U CPU clocked at
2.20GHz with 8 GB of RAM. For each benchmark we present the time it took to run in seconds
(Column 2), the maximum memory usage in kilobytes (Column 3), and the number of constraints
generated for use with Z3 (Column 4).
8 RELATEDWORK
Analyzing Approximate Computation. Researchers have developed a number of program-
ming systems that enable developers to reason about approximate computations: computations
for which the underlying execution substrate (e.g., the programming system and/or hardware
system) augments the behavior of the application to produce approximate results. For example,
EnerJ [Sampson et al. 2011] and FlexJava [Park et al. 2015] enable developers to demonstrate non-
interference between approximate computations and critical parts of the computation that should
not be modified. Meola and Walker propose a sub-structural logic for reasoning about fault toler-
ant programs [Meola and Walker 2010]. Their logic enables the proof system to count the number
of faults that have occurred and therefore reason about properties that may hold for one model
but not another. In contrast to all of these approaches, Leto provides a more expressive and uncon-
strained logic that supports verifying complicated relational properties of the application.
The relaxed programming model [Carbin et al. 2012] enables developers to prove both safety
and accuracy programs for relaxed computations by hand using a Coq library. In contrast, Leto
automates many aspects of the proof. Further, Leto’s first-class execution models enable the de-
veloper to automatically weave in an execution model—which may impact many operations in
the program—whereas the relaxed programming framework requires that operations be modelled
individually by hand.
He et al. [He et al. 2016] leverage the symdiff framework [Lahiri et al. 2012a] to verify instances
of approximate programs. However, it does not enable a developer to integrate an execution model
without directly changing the application’s logic. Leto enables modular specification of execution
models.
Relational Hoare Logic. Researchers have proposed a number of relational Hoare Logics and
verification systems to support verifying relational properties of programs [Barthe et al. 2011;
Benton 2004; Carbin et al. 2012; Lahiri et al. 2012b; Sousa and Dillig 2016]. The verification algo-
rithms produced by Sousa and Dillig [Sousa and Dillig 2016] and Lahiri et al. [Lahiri et al. 2012b]
demonstrate that it is possible to automatically compose proofs for relational verification. Leto’s
verification system differs from that of CHL in that 1) the semantics of the two program executions
are asymmetric and 2) Leto attempts to verify with a specific program composition strategy that
matches the types of proofs that are seen in practice for approximate and unreliably executed pro-
grams. Namely, although the semantics of the two executions of the program differ, their structure
is typically identical and therefore assert and assumes can often be matched to enable maximum
reuse of assumed properties of the reliable execution during the verification of the relaxed.
Type Systems for Self-Stabilization. Self-Stabilizing Java provides developers with a type
system and analysis that enables a developer to prove that any corrupted state of the program
exits the system in a finite amount of time. Leto’s logic (versus the information-flow type system
of Self-Stabilizing Java) enables developers to specify the richer invariants that need to be true
of emerging algorithms for self-stability. For example, instead of verifying that corrupted state
leaves the system within bounded time, Leto enables a developer to verify that the corruption in
the program’s state is small enough that the algorithm’s correction steps will work as designed.
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Fault Rate Analysis. Wehave driven the design and implementation of Leto by the anticipated
fault rates, abstract fault models, and resilience tools exported by the computer architecture, high-
performance computing, and fault tolerance communities. Specifically, soft fault rates have led
major organizations – such as Intel [Kurd et al. 2010; Mitra et al. 2005, 2006; Mukherjee et al. 2003],
Google [Yim 2014], NASA [Johnston 2000], DOE [Snir et al. 2014], and DARPA [Amarasinghe et al.
2009] – to express concern over such faults. Leto is the first system – to our knowledge – to enable
automated verification for these faults.
The assumption of instruction-level arithmetic errors is the most commonmodel for building 1)
application-specific fault analyses andmechanisms [Bronevetsky and de Supinski 2008;Hoemmen and Heroux
2011; Huang and Abraham1984; Oboril et al. 2011; Roy-Chowdhury and Banerjee 1994, 1996; Sao et al.
2016; Sao and Vuduc 2013; Shantharam et al. 2012], 2) software-level fault tolerance analyses and
mechanisms [Li et al. 2016; Reis et al. 2005; Santini et al. 2017;Wei and Pattabiraman 2012; Yim et al.
2011], 3)micro-architectural resilience analyses andmechanisms [Austin 1999; Lu 1982;Meixner et al.
2007], and 4) circuit-level resilience analyses/mechanisms [Bowman et al. 2009, 2011; Kelin et al.
2010; Lilja et al. 2013; Quinn et al. 2015a,b; Turowski et al. 2015].
Mitra et al. have found that combinational logic faults account for 11% of all soft errors [Mitra et al.
2005]. In addition, soft error rates, including combinational faults, are expected to increase as
chips continue grow in the number of transistors [Mitra et al. 2005; Shivakumar et al. 2002]. These
trends have inspired a variety of different contributions, including modeling the propagation of
transient faults [Chen and Tahoori 2012; Omana et al. 2003], analyzing the rate of combinational
soft faults [Buchner et al. 1997; Rao et al. 2007; Wang and Xie 2011; Zhang and Shanbhag 2006],
analyzing the impact of combinational soft faults [Rajaraman et al. 2006], and correcting combina-
tional logic faults [Mitra et al. 2006].
9 CONCLUSION
Emerging computational platforms are increasingly vulnerable to errors. Future computations de-
signed to execute on these platforms must therefore be designed to be fault tolerant and natu-
rally resilient to error. We present a verification system, Leto, that facilitates the verification of
application-specific fault tolerance mechanisms under programmer-specified execution models.
As these proofs frequently relate a faulty execution to a fault-free one, Leto provides assertions
that enable the developer to specify and verify expressions that relate the semantics of both ex-
ecutions. First-class execution models permit developers to convey information about the class
of faults they expect their computational platforms to experience. By giving developers tools to
verify relational invariants under first-class execution models, we enable developers to verify the
self-stability of their programs.
REFERENCES
Alaa R. Alameldeen, Ilya Wagner, Zeshan Chishti, Wei Wu, Chris Wilkerson, and Shih-Lien Lu. 2011. Energy-efficient
Cache Design Using Variable-strength Error-correcting Codes (ISCA).
Saman Amarasinghe, Dan Campbell, William Carlson, Andrew Chien, William Dally, Elmootazbellah Elnohazy, Robert
Harrison,WilliamHarrod, Jon Hiller, Sherman Karp, Charles Koelbel, David Koester, Peter Kogge, John Levesque, Daniel
Reed, Robert Schreiber, Mark Richards, Al Scarpelli, John Shalf, Allan Snavely, and Thomas Sterling. 2009. ExaScale
Software Study: Software Challenges in Extreme Scale Systems. (2009).
JEDEC Solid State Technology Association et al. 2012. JEDEC Standard: DDR4 SDRAM. JESD79-4, Sep (2012).
Todd M Austin. 1999. DIVA: A reliable substrate for deep submicron microarchitecture design (MICRO).
Zelalem Birhanu Aweke, Salessawi Ferede Yitbarek, Rui Qiao, Reetuparna Das, Matthew Hicks, Yossi Oren, and Todd
Austin. 2016. ANVIL: Software-based protection against next-generation rowhammer attacks. ACM SIGPLAN Notices
51, 4 (2016), 743–755.
Michael Barnett, Bor-Yuh Evan Chang, Robert DeLine, Bart Jacobs, and K RustanMLeino. 2005. Boogie: Amodular reusable
verifier for object-oriented programs (FMCO).
23
Mike Barnett, K Rustan M Leino, and Wolfram Schulte. 2004. The Spec# programming system: An overview (CASSIS).
G. Barthe, J. Crespo, and C. Kunz. 2011. Relational verification using product programs (FM).
N. Benton. 2004. Simple relational correctness proofs for static analyses and program transformations (POPL).
S. Borkar. 2005. Designing reliable systems from unreliable components: the challenges of transistor variability and degra-
dation. IEEE Micro 25, 6 (2005).
Keith A Bowman, James W Tschanz, Nam Sung Kim, Janice C Lee, Chris B Wilkerson, Shih-Lien L Lu, Tanay Karnik, and
Vivek K De. 2009. Energy-efficient and metastability-immune resilient circuits for dynamic variation tolerance. IEEE
Journal of Solid-State Circuits 44, 1 (2009), 49–63.
Keith A Bowman, James W Tschanz, Shih-Lien L Lu, Paolo A Aseron, Muhammad M Khellah, Arijit Raychowdhury,
Bibiche M Geuskens, Carlos Tokunaga, Chris B Wilkerson, Tanay Karnik, and Vivek K De. 2011. A 45 nm resilient
microprocessor core for dynamic variation tolerance. IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits 46, 1 (2011), 194–208.
Greg Bronevetsky and Bronis de Supinski. 2008. Soft error vulnerability of iterative linear algebra methods (ICS).
S Buchner,MBaze, D Brown, DMcMorrow, and J Melinger. 1997. Comparison of error rates in combinational and sequential
logic. IEEE transactions on Nuclear Science 44, 6 (1997), 2209–2216.
M. Carbin, D. Kim, S. Misailovic, and M. Rinard. 2012. Proving Acceptability Properties of Relaxed Nondeterministic
Approximate Programs (PLDI).
Michael Carbin and Martin C. Rinard. 2010. Automatically Identifying Critical Input Regions and Code in Applications
(ISSTA).
Daniel Chen, Gabriela Jacques-Silva, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, Ravishankar K Iyer, and Bruce Mealey. 2008. Error behavior
comparison of multiple computing systems: A case study using Linux on Pentium, Solaris on SPARC, and AIX on
POWER (PRDC).
Liang Chen andMehdi B Tahoori. 2012. An efficient probability framework for error propagation and correlation estimation
(IOLTS).
Leonardo De Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An efficient SMT solver (TACAS).
Peng Du, Aurelien Bouteiller, George Bosilca, Thomas Herault, and Jack Dongarra. 2012. Algorithm-based Fault Tolerance
for Dense Matrix Factorizations (PPoPP).
Cormac Flanagan and K Rustan M Leino. 2001. Houdini, an annotation assistant for ESC/Java (FME).
Shaobo He, Shuvendu K Lahiri, and Zvonimir Rakamarić. 2016. Verifying relative safety, accuracy, and termination for
program approximations (NFM).
C. A. R. Hoare. 1969. An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming. Commun. ACM 12, 10 (Oct. 1969), 576–580.
https://doi.org/10.1145/363235.363259
Mark Hoemmen and Michael A Heroux. 2011. Fault-tolerant iterative methods via selective reliability (SC).
Kuang-Hua Huang and Abraham. 1984. Algorithm-based fault tolerance for matrix operations. IEEE transactions on com-
puters 100, 6 (1984).
Tomoo Inoue, Hayato Henmi, Yuki Yoshikawa, and Hideyuki Ichihara. 2011. High-level synthesis for multi-cycle transient
fault tolerant datapaths (IOLTS).
Allan H Johnston. 2000. Scaling and technology issues for soft error rates. (2000).
Lee Hsiao-Heng Kelin, Lilja Klas, Bounasser Mounaim, Relangi Prasanthi, Ivan R Linscott, Umran S Inan, and Mitra Subha-
sish. 2010. LEAP: Layout design through error-aware transistor positioning for soft-error resilient sequential cell design
(IRPS).
Dae-Hyun Kim, Prashant J Nair, and Moinuddin K Qureshi. 2015. Architectural support for mitigating row hammering in
DRAM memories. IEEE Computer Architecture Letters 14, 1 (2015), 9–12.
Jangwoo Kim, Nikos Hardavellas, Ken Mai, Babak Falsafi, and James Hoe. 2007. Multi-bit Error Tolerant Caches Using
Two-Dimensional Error Coding (MICRO).
Yoongu Kim, Ross Daly, Jeremie Kim, Chris Fallin, Ji Hye Lee, Donghyuk Lee, Chris Wilkerson, Konrad Lai, and Onur
Mutlu. 2014. Flipping bits in memory without accessing them: An experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors
(ISCA).
Nasser A Kurd, Subramani Bhamidipati, Christopher Mozak, Jeffrey L Miller, Timothy M Wilson, Mahadev Nemani, and
Muntaquim Chowdhury. 2010. Westmere: A family of 32nm IA processors (ISSCC).
Shuvendu K Lahiri, Chris Hawblitzel, Ming Kawaguchi, and Henrique Rebêlo. 2012a. SYMDIFF: A Language-Agnostic
Semantic Diff Tool for Imperative Programs. (CAV).
Shuvendu K. Lahiri, Chris Hawblitzel, Ming Kawaguchi, and Henrique Rebêlo. 2012b. SYMDIFF: A Language-agnostic
Semantic Diff Tool for Imperative Programs (CAV).
M Lanteigne. 2016. How rowhammer could be used to exploit weaknesses in computer hardware. (2016).
Tuo Li, Jude Angelo Ambrose, Roshan Ragel, and Sri Parameswaran. 2016. Processor Design for Soft Errors: Challenges
and State of the Art. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 49, 3 (2016), 57.
24
K Lilja, M Bounasser, S-J Wen, R Wong, J Holst, N Gaspard, S Jagannathan, D Loveless, and B Bhuva. 2013. Single-event
performance and layout optimization of flip-flops in a 28-nm bulk technology. IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 60,
4 (2013), 2782–2788.
David J. Lu. 1982. Watchdog processors and structural integrity checking. IEEE Trans. Comput. 31, 7 (1982), 681–685.
Albert Meixner, Michael E Bauer, and Daniel Sorin. 2007. Argus: Low-cost, comprehensive error detection in simple cores
(MICRO).
Matthew L. Meola and David Walker. 2010. Faulty Logic: Reasoning About Fault Tolerant Programs (ESOP).
Bertrand Meyer. 1992. Eiffel: The Language. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA.
Subhasish Mitra, Norbert Seifert, Ming Zhang, Quan Shi, and Kee Sup Kim. 2005. Robust system design with built-in
soft-error resilience. Computer 38, 2 (2005), 43–52.
Subhasish Mitra, Ming Zhang, Saad Waqas, Norbert Seifert, Balkaran Gill, and Kee Sup Kim. 2006. Combinational logic
soft error correction (ESOP).
Shubhendu S Mukherjee, ChristopherWeaver, Joel Emer, Steven K Reinhardt, and Todd Austin. 2003. A systematic method-
ology to compute the architectural vulnerability factors for a high-performance microprocessor (MICRO).
Fabian Oboril, Mehdi B Tahoori, Vincent Heuveline, Dimitar Lukarski, and Jan-Philipp Weiss. 2011. Numerical defect
correction as an algorithm-based fault tolerance technique for iterative solvers (PRDC).
Martin Omana, Giacinto Papasso, Daniele Rossi, and Cecilia Metra. 2003. A model for transient fault propagation in
combinatorial logic (IOLTS).
Jongse Park, Hadi Esmaeilzadeh, Xin Zhang, Mayur Naik, and William Harris. 2015. FlexJava: Language Support for Safe
and Modular Approximate Programming (FSE).
RC Quinn, JS Kauppila, TD Loveless, JA Maharrey, JD Rowe, ML Alles, BL Bhuva, RA Reed, M Mounasser, K Lilja, and LW
Massengill. 2015a. Frequency Trends Observed in 32nm SOI Flip-Flops and Combinational Logic. IEEE Transactions on
Nuclear Science (2015).
RC Quinn, JS Kauppila, TD Loveless, JA Maharrey, JD Rowe, MWMcCurdy, EX Zhang, ML Alles, BL Bhuva, RA Reed, WT
Holman, M Bounasser, K Lilja, and LW Massengill. 2015b. Heavy ion SEU test data for 32nm SOI flip-flops (REDW).
R Rajaraman, JS Kim, Narayanan Vijaykrishnan, Yuan Xie, and Mary Jane Irwin. 2006. SEAT-LA: A soft error analysis tool
for combinational logic (VLSI Design).
Rajeev R Rao, Kaviraj Chopra, David T Blaauw, and Dennis M Sylvester. 2007. Computing the soft error rate of a combina-
tional logic circuit using parameterized descriptors. IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits
and Systems 26, 3 (2007), 468–479.
G. Reis, J. Chang, N. Vachharajani, R. Rangan, and D. August. 2005. SWIFT: Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (CGO).
Amber Roy-Chowdhury and Prithviraj Banerjee. 1994. Algorithm-based fault location and recovery for matrix computa-
tions (FTCS).
Amber Roy-Chowdhury and Prithviraj Banerjee. 1996. Algorithm-based fault location and recovery for matrix computa-
tions on multiprocessor systems. IEEE transactions on computers 45, 11 (1996), 1239–1247.
Adrian Sampson, Werner Dietl, Emily Fortuna, Danushen Gnanapragasam, Luis Ceze, and Dan Grossman. 2011. EnerJ:
Approximate data types for safe and general low-power computation (PLDI).
Thiago Santini, Christoph Borchert, Christian Dietrich, Horst Schirmeier, Martin Hoffmann, Olaf Spinczyk, Daniel
Lohmann, Flávio RechWagner, and Paolo Rech. 2017. Effectiveness of Software-Based Hardening for Radiation-Induced
Soft Errors in Real-Time Operating Systems (ARCS).
Piyush Sao, Oded Green, Chirag Jain, and Richard Vuduc. 2016. A Self-Correcting Connected Components Algorithm
(FTXS).
Piyush Sao and Richard Vuduc. 2013. Self-stabilizing iterative solvers (ScalA).
Manu Shantharam, Sowmyalatha Srinivasmurthy, and Padma Raghavan. 2012. Fault tolerant preconditioned conjugate
gradient for sparse linear system solution (ICS).
Premkishore Shivakumar, Michael Kistler, Stephen W Keckler, Doug Burger, and Lorenzo Alvisi. 2002. Modeling the effect
of technology trends on the soft error rate of combinational logic (DSN).
Marc Snir, Robert W Wisniewski, Jacob A Abraham, Sarita V Adve, Saurabh Bagchi, Pavan Balaji, Jim Belak, Pradip Bose,
Franck Cappello, Bill Carlson, et al. 2014. Addressing failures in exascale computing. The International Journal of High
Performance Computing Applications 28, 2 (2014), 129–173.
M. Sousa and I. Dillig. 2016. Cartesian Hoare Logic for Verifying K-safety Properties (PLDI).
Michael B Sullivan and Earl E Swartzlander. 2012. Truncated error correction for flexible approximate multiplication
(ASILOMAR).
Michael B Sullivan and Earl E Swartzlander. 2013. Truncated logarithmic approximation (ARITH).
Anna Thomas and Karthik Pattabiraman. 2016. Error Detector Placement for Soft Computing Applications. ACM Trans.
Embed. Comput. Syst. 15, 1, Article 8 (Jan. 2016), 25 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2801154
25
M Turowski, K Lilja, K Rodbell, and P Oldiges. 2015. 32nm SOI SRAM and latch SEU crosssections measured (heavy ion
data) and determined with simulations (SEE).
R. Venkatagiri, A. Mahmoud, S. K. S. Hari, and S. V. Adve. 2016. Approxilyzer: Towards a systematic framework for
instruction-level approximate computing and its application to hardware resiliency (MICRO).
Sriram Krishnamoorthy Vishal Chandra Sharma, Ganesh Gopalakrishnan. 2016. Towards Resiliency Evaluation of Vector
Programs (DPDNS).
FengWang and Yuan Xie. 2011. Soft error rate analysis for combinational logic using an accurate electrical masking model.
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 8, 1 (2011), 137–146.
Jiesheng Wei and Karthik Pattabiraman. 2012. BLOCKWATCH: Leveraging similarity in parallel programs for error detec-
tion (DSN).
Keun Soo Yim. 2014. Characterization of impact of transient faults and detection of data corruption errors in large-scale
n-body programs using graphics processing units (IPDPS).
Keun Soo Yim, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, and Ravishankar K Iyer. 2010. Measurement-based analysis of fault and error sensi-
tivities of dynamic memory (DSN).
Keun Soo Yim, Cuong Pham, Mushfiq Saleheen, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk, and Ravishankar Iyer. 2011. Hauberk: Lightweight
silent data corruption error detector for gpgpu (IPDPS).
Doe Hyun Yoon and Mattan Erez. 2009. Memory Mapped ECC: Low-cost Error Protection for Last Level Caches (ISCA).
Ming Zhang and Naresh R Shanbhag. 2006. Soft-error-rate-analysis (SERA) methodology. IEEE Transactions on Computer-
Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems 25, 10 (2006), 2140–2155.
26
read-l
⊢l { Q
∗
r [injo (x )/injo (r )] } r = x { Q
∗
r }
read-r
fresh(r ′) ∃([xmem], X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) · injr (P
∗
w [x/xmem])
Q ′∗r =
©­«
∨
([xmem ],X ,P
∗
w ,P
∗
e )∈µ(read)
injr (P
∗
w [x/xmem]) → injr (P
∗
e [x/xmem][∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m )/xm][r
′/result])
ª®¬
µ ⊢r { Q
′∗
r ∧Q
∗
r [injr (r
′)/injr (r )] } r = x { Q
∗
r }
write-l
⊢l { Q
∗
r [injo (r )/injo (x )] } x = r { Q
∗
r }
write-r
fresh(r ′) ∃([x1, x2], X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) · injr (P
∗
w [x/x1][r /x2])
Q ′∗r =
©­«
∨
([x1,x2],X ,P
∗
w ,P
∗
e )∈µ(write)
injr (P
∗
w [x/x1][r /x2]) → injr (P
∗
e [r
′/x1][r /x2][∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m )/xm ])
ª®¬
µ ⊢r { Q
′∗
r ∧Q
∗
r [injr (r
′)/injr (x )] } x = r { Q
∗
r }
relational-assert-l
⊢l { true } assert_r r { true }
relational-assert-r
µ ⊢r { r } assert_r r { r }
Fig. 17. Le and Right Rules for Primitive Statements
A ADDITIONAL PROOF RULES
Figures 17, 18, and 19 expand on the proof rules we presented in Section 4.
A.1 Additional Le and Right Rules
Figure 17 presents the remainder of our left and right rules.
Read. The rules [read-l] and [read-r] give the semantics of reads from memory. The left rule
[read-l] mimics the behavior of [read-l] with the primary differing being that it substitutes the
value of a register, r , for a local variable x . The right rule, [read-r], on the other hand more
closely resembles [binop-r] in that it models the potentially unreliable execution of the read from
memory.
Write. The rules [write-l] and [write-r] give the semantics of writes to memory. These rules
are analogous to [read-l] and [read-r], except modified in their exact implementation to captures
writes to memory.
Relational Assert. The rules [relational-assert-l] and [relational-assert-r] give the se-
mantics of relational assertion statements. These statements are similar to my normal assert state-
ments, but they take relational predicates as arguments rather than standard predicates. The logic
requires that the condition of a relational assertion is verified in relaxed execution, but in reliable
execution the logic treats these statements as no-ops.
A.2 Le and Right Rules for Control Flow
Figure 18 presents the left and right rules for control flow statements.With the exception of [while-
l], the rules adhere to the standard formalization as seen in traditional Hoare logic. The only dis-
tinction between these rules and their standard implementation is that they operate over relational
predicates.
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seq-l
⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } ⊢l { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }
⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 ; s2 { Q
∗
r }
seq-r
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } µ ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 ; s2 { Q
∗
r }
if-l
b ≡ injo(r ) = true ⊢l { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { Q
∗
r } ⊢l { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b } s { Q
∗
r }
⊢l { P
∗
r } if r s1 s2 { Q
∗
r }
if-r
b ≡ injo(r ) = true µ ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { Q
∗
r } µ ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b } s { Q
∗
r }
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } if r s1 s2 { Q
∗
r }
while-l
b ≡ injo(r ) = true
⊢l { true } while r P
∗
r s { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b }
while-r
b ≡ injo(r ) = true µ ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { P
∗
r }
µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } while r P
∗
r s { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b }
Fig. 18. Le and Right Rules for Structure and Control Flow
weak
P∗r |= P
′∗
r µ ⊢ { P
′∗
r } s { Q
′∗
r } Q
′∗
r |= Q
∗
r
µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }
while
b ≡ r = true ⊢ { R∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s { R
∗ }
⊢l { R
∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s { R
∗ } µ ⊢r { R
∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s { R
∗ }
µ ⊢ { R∗ } while r R∗ s { R∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) }
Fig. 19. Lockstep Control Flow and Structural Rules
The rule [while-l] assumes that P∗r ∧ ¬b holds after the while loop and does not place any
constraints on the environment prior to the loop. In other words, I do not verify the invariants on
loops that run under left semantics.
A.3 Additional Lockstep Rules
Figure 19 presents the remainder of our lockstep control flow and structure rules.
Weakening. The rule [weak] gives the standard semantics for weakening as found in the stan-
dard Hoare logic with the distinction that it operates on relational predicates.
While. The rule [while] gives the semantics of while statements. The rule is similar in design
to the rule for if statements in that it must also consider cases in which the control flow of the two
executions diverge. The rule first considers the case where the two executions proceed in lockstep
by both executing an iteration of the loop. The next two cases leverage the left and right rules to
consider the cases when:
• The relaxed execution halts, but the reliable execution executes an additional iteration.
• The reliable execution halts, but the relaxed execution executes an additional iteration, re-
spectively.
B PROOFS OF PROPERTIES
Leto’s program logic ensures two basic properties of Leto programs: preservation and progress.
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Lemma B.1 (Left Preservation).
If ⊢l { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1, then (ε
′
1, ε2) |= Q
∗
r .
Leto’s left preservation property states that given a proof in the left rules, for a pair of environ-
ments satisfying the precondition of the proof, then if a reliable execution of s terminates, then
the resulting environment pair satisfies the proof’s postcondition.
Proof. By induction on the lemma statement:
• Assign-l. Stepping 〈s, ε1〉 produces an environment ε
′
1 which differs from ε1 only in that
r is mapped to n in σ . As ε1 |= Q
∗
r [n/injo(r )], ε
′
1 trivially satisfies Q
∗
r . Additionally, as the
precondition contains no substitutions on injr (r ), ε2 trivially satisfies Q
∗
r .
• binop-l. Similar to assign-l.
• read-l. Similar to assign-l.
• write-l. Similar to assign-l.
• assert-l. Stepping 〈s, ε1〉 by definition adds r to ε1 to form ε
′
1. Therefore, (ε
′
1, ε2) |= injo(r ).
• assume-l. Similar to assert-l.
• relational-assert-l. Relational assertions in left mode do nothing.
• seq-l. We start with inversion on ⊢l { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }, which yields ⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } and
⊢l { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }. Applying the induction hypothesis to ⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } yields (ε
′′
1 , ε2) |=
R∗r . Applying the induction hypothesis to ⊢l { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r } yields (ε
′
1, ε2) |= Q
∗
r .
• while-l. Stepping 〈s, ε1〉 by definition adds P
∗
r to ε1 to form ε
′
1. Therefore, (ε
′
1, ε2) |= P
∗
r .
• if-l. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where b is true, we
apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢l { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { Q
∗
r }. In the casewhereb is false, we apply
the induction hypothesis to ⊢l { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b } s { Q
∗
r }.

Lemma B.2 (Right Preservation).
If µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then (ε1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r .
Leto’s right preservation property states that given a proof in the right rules, for a pair of envi-
ronments satisfying the precondition of the proof, then if execution of s under the execution model
specification µ terminates, then the resulting environment pair satisfies the proof’s postcondition.
Proof. By induction on the lemma statement:
• assign-r. Stepping 〈s, ε2〉 produces an environment ε
′
2 which differs from ε2 only in that
r is mapped to n in σ . As ε1 |= Q
∗
r [n/injo(r )], ε
′
2 trivially satisfies Q
∗
r . Additionally, as the
precondition contains no substitutions on injr (r ), ε1 trivially satisfies Q
∗
r .
• binop-r. Stepping 〈s, ε2〉 produces an environment ε
′
2 which differs from ε2 only in that r
is mapped to r ′ in σ . The restrictions placed on r ′ in Q ′∗r codify the operator substitution
routine from f-binop in the operational semantics. Therefore, the runtime always sets r in
a way such that the resulting environment satisfies Q∗r . Additionally, as the precondition
contains no substitutions on injr (r ), ε1 trivially satisfies Q
∗
r .
• read-r. Similar to binop-r.
• write-r. Similar to binop-r.
• assert-r. Stepping 〈s, ε2〉 does not modify ε2. Therefore, ε2 = ε
′
2. Since the precondition and
postcondition are identical, (ε1, ε
′
2) |= r .
• assume-r. Similar to assert-r.
• relational-assert-r. Similar to assert-r.
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• seq-r. We start with inversion on ⊢r { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }, which yields ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } and
⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }. Applying the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } yields (ε1, ε
′′
2 ) |=
R∗r . Applying the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r } yields (ε1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r .
• while-r. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where b is true,
we apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { P
∗
r }. This proves that P
∗
r holds after
each loop iteration. Upon exiting the loop, ¬b trivially holds. In the case where b is false, the
loop does not run and therefore (ε1, ε
′
2) trivially satisfies P
∗
r ∧ ¬b.
• if-r. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where b is true, we
apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { Q
∗
r }. In the case where b is false, we
apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b } s { Q
∗
r }.

Theorem B.3 (Preservation).
If µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1 and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then (ε
′
1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗
r
Leto’s preservation property states that given a proof in the program logic of a program s , for
all pairs of environments (ε1, ε2) that satisfy the proof’s precondition, if the executions of s under
both the reliable semantics and the relaxed semantics terminate in a pair of environments (ε ′1, ε
′
2),
then this pair of environments satisfies the proof’s postcondition. Note that this states the partial
correctness of the logic and does not establish termination (and therefore total correctness).
Proof. By induction on the theorem statement:
• stage. We first perform inversion on s . Then, we apply Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r }
and Theorem B.2 to ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }.
• inverse-stage. We first perform inversion on s . Then, we apply Theorem B.2 to
⊢r { P
∗
r } s2 { R
∗
r } and Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { R
∗
r } s1 { Q
∗
r }.
• split. We first perform inversion on s , followed by inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗r } s ∼ s { Q
∗
r }. Then,
we apply Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { P
∗
r } s { R
∗
r } and Theorem B.2 to ⊢r { R
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }.
• seq. We start with inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗ } s { Q∗ }, which yields µ ⊢ { P∗ } s1 { R
∗ }
and µ ⊢ { R∗ } s2 { Q
∗ }. Applying the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { P∗ } s1 { R
∗ } yields
(ε ′′1 , ε
′′
2 ) |= R
∗. Applying the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { R∗ } s2 { Q
∗ } yields (ε ′1, ε
′
2) |= Q
∗.
• weak. We start with inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }. Applying the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P ′∗r } s { Q
′∗
r } yields (ε
′
1, ε
′
2) |= Q
′∗
r . Since Q
′∗
r |= Q
∗
r , (ε
′
1, ε
′
2) ⊢ Q
∗
r .
• if. We begin with inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where injo(b) ∧ injr (b), we
apply the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s1 { Q
∗ }. In the case where
¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s2 ∼r s1 { Q
∗ }.
In the case where injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s1 ∼r s2 { Q
∗ }.
In the case where ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s2 { Q
∗ }.
• while. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where injo(b) ∧
injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { R
∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s { R
∗ }. This
proves that R∗ holds after each loop iteration. Upon exiting the loop, ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b)
trivially holds. The cases where ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) and injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) are similar to the
previous case. In the case where¬injo(b)∧¬injr (b), the loop does not run in either execution
and therefore (ε ′1, ε
′
2) trivially satisfies the postcondition.
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Lemma B.4 (Right Progress).
If µ ⊢r { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then ¬failed(ε
′
2) where failed(〈fail, ε〉) =
true
Leto’s right progress property states that given a proof in the right rules of a program s , for all
pairs of environments (ε1, ε2) that satisfy the proof’s precondition, then if the relaxed execution of
s under µ terminates, then it does not terminate in an error. The right progress property establishes
that a Leto’s program of right rules satisfies all of its assert and assume statements.
Proof. By induction on the theorem statement:
• assign-r. Assignment cannot fail.
• binop-r. We start with inversion on s , giving us the fact that the dynamic seman-
tics is always able to perform an operator substitution (∃([x1, x2],X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) ·
injr (P
∗
w [r1/x1][r2/x2])), so binary operations cannot fail.
• read-r. We start with inversion on s , giving us the fact that the dynamic semantics is always
able to perform an operator substitution (∃([xmem],X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) · injr (P
∗
w [x/xmem])), so
reads cannot fail.
• write-r. We start with inversion on s , giving us the fact that the dynamic seman-
tics is always able to perform an operator substitution (∃([x1, x2],X , P
∗
w , P
∗
e ) ∈ µ(⊕) ·
injr (P
∗
w [x/x1][r/x2])), so writes cannot fail.
• assert-r. Stepping 〈s, ε2〉 produces the environment ε
′
2 where ε2 = ε
′
2. Since ¬failed(ε2),
¬failed(ε ′2) trivially holds.
• assume-r. Similar to assert-r.
• relational-assert-r. Similar to assert-r.
• seq-r. We start with inversion on ⊢r { P
∗
r } s { Q
∗
r }, which yields ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } and
⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }. Applying Theorem B.2 to ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } yields (ε1, ε
′′
2 ) |= R
∗
r . Ap-
plying the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r } provides ¬failed(ε
′′
2 ). Applying the
induction hypothesis to ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r } yields ¬failed(ε
′
2).
• while-r. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where b is true,
we apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { P
∗
r }.
In the case where b is false, the loop does not run and therefore (ε2 = ε
′
2) trivially satisfies
¬failed(ε ′2).
Lastly, since (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r , the invariant check before the loop cannot fail.
• if-r. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where b is true, we
apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ b } s { Q
∗
r }. In the case where b is false, we
apply the induction hypothesis to ⊢r { P
∗
r ∧ ¬b } s { Q
∗
r }.

Theorem B.5 (Progress).
If µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r } and (ε1, ε2) |= P
∗
r and 〈s, ε1〉 ⇓ ε
′
1 and 〈s, ε2〉 ⇓µ ε
′
2, then ¬failed(ε
′
2) where
failed(〈fail, ε〉) = true
Leto’s progress property states that given a proof in the program logic of a program s , for all
pairs of environments (ε1, ε2) that satisfy the proof’s precondition, if the reliable execution of s
terminates successfully, then if the relaxed execution of s under µ terminates, then it does not
terminate in an error. The progress property establishes that a Leto’s program satisfies all of its
assert and assume statements – provided that all reliable executions of the program also satisfy
the program’s assert and assume statements.
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Proof. By induction on the theorem statement:
• stage. We first perform inversion on s . Then, we apply Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r }
and Theorem B.4 to ⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }.
• inverse-stage. We first perform inversion on s . Then, we apply Theorem B.4 to
⊢r { P
∗
r } s2 { R
∗
r } and Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { R
∗
r } s1 { Q
∗
r }.
• split. We first perform inversion on s , followed by inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗r } s ∼ s { Q
∗
r }.
Then, we apply Theorem B.1 to ⊢l { P
∗
r } s1 { R
∗
r }. Finally, we apply Theorem B.4 to
⊢r { R
∗
r } s2 { Q
∗
r }.
• seq. We start with inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗ } s { Q∗ }, which yields µ ⊢ { P∗ } s1 { R
∗ }
and µ ⊢ { R∗ } s2 { Q
∗ }. Applying the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { P∗ } s1 { R
∗ } yields
¬failed(ε ′′2 ). Applying the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { R
∗ } s2 { Q
∗ } yields ¬failed(ε ′2).
• weak. We start with inversion on µ ⊢ { P∗r } s { Q
∗
r }. Applying the induction hypothesis
to µ ⊢ { P ′∗r } s { Q
′∗
r } yields ¬failed(ε
′′
2 ). Since P
∗
r |= P
′∗
r and Q
′∗
r |= Q
∗
r , ¬failed(ε
′′
2 ) →
¬failed(ε ′2).
• if. We begin with inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where injo(b) ∧ injr (b), we
apply the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s1 { Q
∗ }. In the case where
¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s2 ∼r s1 { Q
∗ }.
In the case where injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s1 ∼r s2 { Q
∗ }.
In the case where ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to
µ ⊢ { P∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s2 { Q
∗ }.
• while. First, we perform inversion on s . Then, we destruct b. In the case where injo(b) ∧
injr (b), we apply the induction hypothesis to µ ⊢ { R
∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s { R
∗ }.
In the case where injo(b)∧¬injr (b), taking a step from ⊢l { R
∗ ∧ injo(b) ∧ ¬injr (b) } s { R
∗ }
yeilds ε ′2 where ε
′
2 = ε2. Since ¬failed(ε2), ¬failed(ε
′
2) holds as well.
In the ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) case, we apply Theorem B.4 to
µ ⊢r { R
∗ ∧ ¬injo(b) ∧ injr (b) } s { R
∗ }.
In the casewhere¬injo(b)∧¬injr (b), the loop doesn’t run and therefore ε2 = ε
′
2, so¬failed(ε
′
2)
trivially holds.
Lastly, since (ε1, ε2) |= R
∗, the invariant check before the loop cannot fail.

C DYNAMIC SEMANTICS
Figure 20 presents an abbreviated dynamic semantics of Leto’s language. We present an extended
semantics in Appendix D. Leto’s semantics models an abstract machine that includes a frame, a
heap, and an execution model state. Leto allocates memory for program variables (both scalar and
array) in the heap. A frame serves two roles: 1) a frame maps a program variable to the address
of the memory region allocated for that variable in the heap, and 2) a frame maps a register to
its current value in the program. The model state stores the values for state variables within the
execution model.
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f-binop
µ(⊕, [x1,x2],X , Pw , Pe ) ∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m ) m[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2] |= Pw
m′[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2][∀xm ∈ X · xm 7→ x
′
m ][result 7→ n3] |= Pe dom(m) = dom(m
′)
〈m, ⊕, (n1,n2)〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
binop
n1 = σ (r1) n1 = σ (r2) 〈m,⊕, (n1,n2)〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
〈r = r1 ⊕ r2, 〈σ , h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈r = n3, 〈σ , h, θ, m
′〉〉
read
a = σ (x) n = h(a) q = θ(a) 〈m, read, (n,q)〉 ⇓µ 〈n
′
, m′〉
〈r = x, 〈σ , h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈r = n′, 〈σ , h, θ, m′〉〉
write
a = σ (x) nold = h(a) nnew = σ (r ) q = θ(a) 〈m, write, (nold,nnew,q)〉 ⇓µ 〈nr , m
′〉
〈x = r , 〈σ , h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ , h[a 7→ nr ], θ, m
′〉〉
assign
〈r = n, 〈σ , h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ [r 7→ n], h, θ, m〉〉
assert-t
π1(ε)(r ) = true
〈assert r , ε〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, ε〉
assert-f
π1(ε)(r ) = false
〈assert r , ε〉
µ
−→ 〈fail, ε〉
assume
〈assume r , ε〉
µ
−→ 〈assert r , ε〉
if-t
π1(ε)(r ) = true
〈if r s1 s2, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s1, ε〉
if-f
π1(ε)(r ) = false
〈if r s1 s2, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s2, ε〉
seq1
〈s1, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s ′1, ε
′〉
〈s1 ; s2, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s ′1 ; s2, ε
′〉
seq2
〈skip ; s2, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s2, ε〉
while-f
π1(ε)(r ) = false
〈while r s, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, ε〉
while-t
π1(ε)(r ) = true
〈while r s, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s ; while r s, ε〉
Fig. 20. Semantics of Execution Model and Instructions
C.1 Preliminaries
Frames, Heaps, Model States, Environments. A frame, σ ∈ Σ = Var∪Reg → IntN, is a finite
map from variables and registers to N-bit integers. A heap, h ∈ H = Loc → IntN, is a finite map
from locations (n ∈ Loc ⊂ IntN) to N-bit integer values. A region map, θ ∈ Θ = Loc → Region, is a
finite map from locations to memory regions. A model state,m ∈ M = Var → IntN, is a finite map
frommodel state variables to N-bit integer values. An environment, ε ∈ E = Σ×H×Θ×M , is a tuple
consisting of a frame, a heap, a region map, and a model state. An execution model specification,
µ ⊆ Op × list(Var) × set(Var) × P × P , is a relation consisting of tuples of an operation op ∈ Op, a
list of input variables, a set of modified variables, and two unary logical predicates representing
the when and ensures clauses of the operation.
Initialization. For clarity of presentation, we assume a compilation and execution model in
which memory locations for program variables are allocated and the corresponding mapping in
the frame are done prior to execution of the program (similar in form to C-style declarations).
C.2 Execution Model Semantics
Figure 20 provides an abbreviated presentation of the execution model relation 〈m, op, (args)〉 ⇓µ
〈n, m′〉. The relation states that given the arguments, args to an operation op, evaluation of the
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operation from the model statem yields a result n and a new model statem′ under the execution
model specification µ .
f-binop
µ(⊕, [x1, x2],X , Pw , Pe ) ∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m ) m[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2] |= Pw
m′[x1 7→ n1][x2 7→ n2][∀xm ∈ X · xm 7→ x
′
m ][result 7→ n3] |= Pe dom(m) = dom(m
′)
〈m,⊕, (n1,n2)〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
The [f-binop] rule specifies the meaning of this relation for binary operations. This relation
states that the value of an operation ⊕ given a tuple of input values (n1,n2) and an execution
model state m evaluates to value n3 and a new model state m
′. The rule relies on the relation
µ(op,vlist,X , Pw , Pe )which specifies the list of argument names, vlist, the set of modified variables
X , the precondition Pw , and the postcondition Pe for the operation op in the developer-provided
execution model. The set of modified variables is the union of the modifies clauses in the oper-
ation’s specification. The precondition of an operation is the conjunction of the when clauses in
the operation’s specification. The postcondition of an operation is the conjunction of the ensures
clauses in the operation’s specification.
The semantics of the model relation non-deterministically selects an operation specification,
result value, and output model state subject to the constraint that: 1) the current model state satis-
fies the precondition (after the inputs to the operation have been appropriately assigned into the
model state), 2) the output model state satisfies the postcondition (after the inputs, modified vari-
ables, and result value have been appropriately assigned into the model state), and 3) the domains
of the input and output state are the same.
Because of the uniformity of the execution model specification, the semantics for other opera-
tions (e.g., reads and writes) is similar with the sole distinction being the number of arguments
passed to the operation. For clarity of presentation, we elide the presentation of rules for those
operations, but we provide them in Appendix D, Figure 22.
C.3 Language Semantics
Figure 20 presents the non-deterministic small-step transition relation 〈s, ε〉
µ
−→ 〈s ′, ε ′〉 of a Leto
program. The relation states that execution of statement s from the environment ε takes one step
yielding the statement s ′ and environment ε ′ under the execution model specification µ . The se-
mantics of the statements are largely similar to that of traditional approaches except for the ability
to the statements to encounter faults. Broadly, we categorize Leto’s instructions into four cate-
gories: register instructions, memory instructions, assertions, and control flow.
Register Instructions. The rules [assign] and [binop] specify the semantics of two of Leto’s
register manipulation instructions. [assign] defines the semantics of assigning an integer value to
a register, r = n. This has the expected semantics updating the value of r within the current frame
with the value n. Of note is that register assignment executes fully reliably without faults.
[binop] specifies the semantics of a register only binary operation, r = r1 ⊕ r2. Note that reads
of the input registers execute fully reliably. The result of the operation is n3, which is the value
of the operation given the semantics of that operation’s execution model when executed from the
model state m on parameters n1 and n2. Executing the execution model may change the values
of the execution model’s state variables. Therefore, the instruction evaluates to an instruction
that assigns n3 to the destination register and evaluates with a environment that consists of the
unmodified frame, the unmodified heap, and the modified execution model state. Note that by
virtue of the fact that both the frame and heap are unmodified, faults in register instructions cannot
modify the contents or organization of memory. This modeling choice is consistent with standard
fault modeling approaches.
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Memory Instructions. The rules [read] and [write] specify the semantics of two of Leto’s
memory manipulation instructions. [read] defines the semantics of reading the value of a pro-
gram variable x from it’s corresponding memory location: r = x . The rule fetches the program
variable’s memory address from the frame, reads the value of the memory location n = h(a) and
the region the memory location belongs to q = θ (a) and then executes the execution model with
the program variable’s current value in memory and the memory region it resides in as a param-
eters. The execution model non-deterministically yields a result n′ that the rule uses to complete
its implementing by issuing an assignment to the register.
[write] defines the semantics of writing the value of a register to memory. The rule reads the
value of the memory location to record the old value of the memory location, reads the value of
the input register, fetches the region the memory location corresponds to, and then executes the
execution model with these values as parameters. The execution model yields a new value nr that
the rule then assigns to the value the program variable.
Assertions. The rules [assert-t] and [assume-t] specify the semantics of assert and assume
statements, respectively. These statements have standard semantics, yielding a skip and contin-
uing the execution of the program if their conditions are satisfied. For either of these statements,
if their conditions evaluate to false, then execution yields fail denoting that execution has failed
and become stuck in error.
Control Flow. The rules for control flow ([if-t], [if-f], [seq1], [seq2], [while-f], and [while-
t]) have standard semantics. An important note is that the semantics of these statements is such
that the transfer of control from one instruction to another always executes reliably and, there-
fore, faults do not introduce control flow errors into the program. This modeling assumption is
consistent with standard fault injection and reliability analysis models [Vishal Chandra Sharma
2016].
D FULL SEMANTICS
In this appendix we present the full dynamic semantics of the Leto language. We have elided
the rules presented in Figure 20 as they remain unchanged. A preprocessing pass performs the
following actions:
• It places all variables without a label into a reliable memory region.
• It flattens multidimensional vectors into single dimensional vectors.
• It inlines function calls.
The alloc function we use in declare and declare-array takes a mapping from variables to
addresses σ and an integer n and returns the first addresses in a contiguous block of n unmapped
addresses in σ .
Figures 21 and 22 expand on the operational semantics we present in Figure 20.
E VERIFICATION ALGORITHM
Figures 23, and 24 present the core of Leto’s verification algorithm. The algorithm performs for-
ward symbolic execution to discharge verification conditions generated by assert, assert_t,
invariant, and invariant_r statements in the program. The algorithm directly implements the
Hoare-style relational program logic from Section 4.
Preliminaries. We denote Leto’s verification algorithm by the function Ψ, which takes as input a
statement s , a logical predicate σ , a model specificationm, and a verification mode c . The statement
s is the statement to be verified, σ is the symbolic context under which the verification algorithm
is invoked,m computes the symbolic representation for a operation in the execution model.
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read-array
a = σ (x ) no = h(o(r2)) n = h(a + no ) q = θ (a) 〈m, read, (n, q)〉 ⇓µ 〈n
′
, m′ 〉
〈r1 = x [r2], 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈r1 = n
′
, 〈σ, h, θ, m′ 〉〉
write-array
a = σ (x )
no = h(o(r2)) nold = h(a + no ) nnew = σ (r1) q = θ (a) 〈m, write, (nold, nnew, q)〉 ⇓µ 〈nr , m
′ 〉
〈x [r2] = r1, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ, h[(a + no ) 7→ nr ], θ, m
′ 〉〉
relational-assert
〈assert_r r, ε 〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, ε 〉
declare
a = alloc(σ, 1)
〈@region(q) τ x, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ 0], θ [a 7→ q], m〉〉
declare-array
a = alloc(σ, n) h′ = h[a 7→ 0] . . . [(a + n − 1) 7→ 0]
〈@region(q) τ x (n), 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
µ
−→ 〈skip, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h′, θ [a 7→ q], m〉〉
forall-t
a = alloc(σ, 1)
∀n . 〈b, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈true, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉
〈forall(τ x )(b), 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈true, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
forall-f
a = alloc(σ, 1)
∃n . 〈b, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈false, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉
〈forall(τ x )(b), 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈false, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
exists-t
a = alloc(σ, 1)
∃n . 〈b, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈true, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉
〈exists(τ x )(b), 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈true, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
exists-f
a = alloc(σ, 1)
∀n . 〈b, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈false, 〈σ [x 7→ a], h[a 7→ n], θ [a 7→ reliable], m〉〉
〈exists(τ x )(b), 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉 ⇓µ 〈false, 〈σ, h, θ, m〉〉
Fig. 21. Extension to Dynamic Language Semantics
The control value c ∈ C = {lock, left, right} determines whether or not the algorithm is perform-
ing verification in lockstep mode, left mode, or right mode, respectively. When performing verifi-
cation in lockstep, the algorithm models the original and relaxed execution as each executing an
instruction one at a time. In this mode, the algorithm is able to demonstrate an easy correspon-
dence between the two executions that therefore enables the algorithm to, for example, transfer
assumed properties of the original execution over to verify the relaxed execution. For both left
mode and right mode, the algorithm assumes the two executions have diverged and, therefore,
that there is no simple correspondence between the two executions. In left mode, the algorithm
symbolically evaluates the original execution of the program, ignoring the verification conditions
of the required for the relaxed execution. In right mode, the algorithm symbolically evalutes the
relaxed execution of the program and checks the verification conditions that are required of the
relaxed execution.
The function vexp(e,m, c) maps a standard unary expression e to a constraint that represent
the resulting value in either the original or relaxed execution. For example, vexp maps a variable
reference x to either the variable reference x<o> or x<r> if c equals left or right, respectively.
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m-declare
〈τ x , 〈h, o〉〉 → 〈skip, 〈h[x 7→ 0], o〉〉
m-assign
〈e, 〈h, o〉〉 ⇓ 〈n, 〈h, o〉〉
〈x = e, 〈h, o〉〉 → 〈skip, 〈h[x 7→ n], o〉〉
m-declare-op
〈operator ⊕ x∗1 when pw modifies x
∗
2 ensures pe , 〈h, o〉〉 → 〈skip, 〈h, o :: 〈⊕, x
∗
1 , pw , pe 〉〉〉
f-read
o = µ(read, [x],X , Pw , Pe ) o ∈ q ∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m) m[x1 7→ n1] |= Pw
m′[x1 7→ n1][∀xm ∈ X · xm 7→ x
′
m][result 7→ n2] |= Pe dom(m) = dom(m
′)
〈model.read(n1,q), m〉 ⇓µ 〈n2, m
′〉
f-write
o = µ(write, [x1, x2],X , Pw , Pe )
o ∈ q ∀xm ∈ X · fresh(x
′
m) m[x1 7→ nold][x2 7→ nnew] |= Pw
m′[x1 7→ n3][x2 7→ nnew][∀xm ∈ X · xm 7→ x
′
m] |= Pe dom(m) = dom(m
′)
〈model.write(nold,nnew,q), m〉 ⇓µ 〈n3, m
′〉
Fig. 22. Extension to Dynamic Execution Model Semantics
The function returns a constraint because the expression may reference an operation suffixed with
a period, denoting that the operation has a custom semantics. The constraint characterizes the non-
deterministic choice of the operation’s implementation. The function uses the model specification
m to compute the symbolic representation for these operations.
The function vbexp(b,m, c) maps a standard unary boolean expression b to a constraint. Its
operation is similar to that of vexp.
Assignment. For an assignment statement x=e , the algorithm maps the e to an appropriate
relational expression for both the original and relaxed execution by creating the constraint that
x in the original (relaxed) execution has the value e . The algorithm then uses the join(·) function
to return a result. The join(·) function joins two constraints into a conjunction depending on the
value of c . If c = lock – denoting the algorithm is modelling the lockstep execution of both the
original and relaxed executions – then the join includes both constraints. If c = left or c = right –
denoting that the algorithm is modeling the original or relaxed execution, respectively – then join
includes only the first or second constraint, respectively.
Assume and Assert. The algorithm verifies both assert and assume using the same logical
approach. The algorithmfirst generates the verification conditions for both the original and relaxed
executions, namely that the statement’s boolean expression bv is true (σo and σr , respectively).
The algorithm next considers two cases. In lockstep mode, the algorithm verifies that the current
context σ extended with the assumption that the assertion or assumption is true in the original
execution implies that the verification condition holds. The function Verify(σ1,σ2) verifies that σ1
implies σ2 (Leto specifically uses an SMT solver to do so) and halts the execution of the algorithm if
the implication does not hold or the solver is unable to demonstrate that it holds. In right mode, the
algorithm directly verifies that the current context implies the verification condition. The insight
is that unlike in lockstep mode, the algorithm must verify the relaxed execution independently
of the original execution and, therefore, the algorithm cannot leverage the assumption that the
assertion or assumption is valid in the original execution. In the last step, the algorithm returns
the join of the two verification conditions.
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1: function Ψ(s,σ ,m,c)
2: match s do
3: x = e :
4: σo ← (x<o> = vexp(e,m, left))
5: σr ← (x<r> = vexp(e,m, right))
6: return σ ∧ join(c,σo ,σr )
7: assert bv :
8: assume bv :
9: σo ← vbexp(bv ,m, left)
10: σr ← vbexp(bv ,m, right)
11: if (c == lock) then
12: Verify(σ ∧ σo ,σr )
13: else if (c == right) then
14: Verify(σ ,σr )
15: end if
16: return σ ∧ join(c,σo ,σr )
17: assert_r (br ):
18: Verify(σ ,br )
19: return σ ∧ br
20: s1;s2:
21: return Ψ(s2,σ ∧ Ψ(s1,σ ,m,c),m, c)
22: end match
23: end function
Fig. 23. Verification Algorithm (sans Control Flow)
Relational Assert. The algorithm verifies relational assertions under the current context. If
verification fails, then the verification procedure halts. If verification succeeds, then the algorithm
appends the assertion to the context and returns the result.
If. Figure 24 presents the algorithm’s implementation for if statement verification. The algo-
rithm has a different implementation for each of the verification modes:
• Lockstep. In lockstep mode, the algorithm verifies and generates a symbolic representation
for four different scenarios: the case when 1) the original execution and relaxed execution
both take the true branch of the statement, represented by σ1, 2) the original execution and
relaxed execution both take the false branch of the statement, σ2, 3) the original execution
takes the true branch and the relaxed execution takes the false branch, σ4, and 4) the original
execution takes the false branch and the relaxed execution takes the true branch, σ6.
• Left. In left mode, the algorithm need only generate a symbolic representation for the orig-
inal execution. The algorithm achieves this by conjoining the results of recursive calls to Ψ
on s1 and s2 given the current context.
• Right. In right mode, the algorithm need only generate a symbolic representation and dis-
charge the verification conditions for the relaxed execution. Similar to that of left mode,
algorithm achieves this by conjoining the results of recursive calls to Ψ on s1 and s2.
For performance, Leto only considers scenarios that are potentially viable. The Check(σ1,σ2)
function returns true if a satisfying assignment for σ1 → σ2 may exist and false otherwise. If
Check is able to prove that such an implication cannot exist, then Leto does not recurse on that
execution scenario.
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1: function Ψ(if (b) {s1} else {s2},σ ,m,c) =
2: σo ← vbexp(b,m, left), σr ← vbexp(b,m, right)
3: if (c == lock) then
4: if Check(σ ,σo ∧ σr ) then
5: σ1 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ σo ∧ σr , lock)
6: else σ1 ← σ
7: end if
8:
9: if Check(σ ,¬σo ∧ ¬σr ) then
10: σ2 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ ¬σo ∧ ¬σr , lock)
11: else σ2 ← σ
12: end if
13:
14: if Check(σ ,σo ∧ ¬σr ) then
15: σ3 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ σo ∧ ¬σr , left)
16: σ4 ← Ψ(s2,σ ∧ σ3 ∧ σo ∧ ¬σr , right)
17: else σ4 ← σ
18: end if
19:
20: if Check(σ ,¬σo ∧ σr ) then
21: σ5 ← Ψ(s2,σ ∧ ¬σo ∧ σr , left)
22: σ6 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ σ5 ∧ ¬σo ∧ σr , right)
23: else σ6 ← σ
24: end if
25:
26: return (σ1 ∧ σ2 ∧ σ4 ∧ σ6)
27: else if (c == left) then
28: if Check(σ ,σo ) then σ1 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ σo , left)
29: else σ1 ← σ
30: end if
31:
32: if Check(σ ,¬σo ) then σ2 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ ¬σo , left)
33: else σ2 ← σ
34: end if
35:
36: return (σ1 ∧ σ2)
37: else if (c == right) then
38: if Check(σ ,σr ) then σ1 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ σr , right)
39: else σ1 ← σ
40: end if
41:
42: if Check(σ ,¬σr ) then σ2 ← Ψ(s1,σ ∧ ¬σr , right)
43: else σ2 ← σ
44: end if
45:
46: return (σ1 ∧ σ2)
47: end if
48: end function
Fig. 24. If statement verification algorithm
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1: function Inf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m, c,bpv ,bpr ) =
2: σo ← vbexp(b,m, left), σr ← vbexp(b,m, right)
3: if (c == lock) then
4: po ← vbexp(bv ,m, left), pr ← vbexp(bv ,m, right)
5: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ :: po,pr :: br )
6: σc ← σ :: po :: pr :: br :: vbexp(bpv ,m, left) :: vbexp(bpr ,m, right)
7: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: σo :: σr ,m, lock),br :: po :: pr )
8: (r3,bf v 3,bf r 3) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: ¬σo :: σr ,m, right),br :: pr )
9: if (r1 == unknown ∨ r2 == unknown ∨ r3 == unknown) then
10: returnWeakInf(while (b) (true) (true) {sb },σ ,m, c,po :: pr :: br ,bpv ,bpr )
11: else if (r1 == sat ∨ r2 == sat ∨ r3 == sat) then
12: bf v ← bf v 1 ∪ bf v 2 ∪ bf v 3
13: bf r ← bf r 1 ∪ bf r 2 ∪ bf r 3
14: return Inf(while (b) (bv \ bf v ) (br \ bf r ) {sb },σ ,m, c,bpv ,bpr )
15: else
16: return (bv ,br )
17: end if
18: else if (c == right) then
19: p ← vbexp(bv ,m, right), ppv ← vbexp(bpv ,m, right)
20: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ ,p :: br )
21: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σ :: p :: br :: σr :: ppv ,m, right), p :: br )
22: if (r1 == unknown ∨ r2 == unknown) then
23: returnWeakInf(while (b) (true) (true) {sb },σ ,m, c,p :: br ,bpv ,bpr )
24: else if (r1 == sat ∨ r2 == sat) then
25: bf v ← bf v 1 ∪ bf v 2∪
26: bf r ← bf r 1 ∪ bf r 2∪
27: return Inf(while (b) (bv \ bf v ) (br \ bf r ) {sb },σ ,m, c,bpv ,bpr )
28: else
29: return (bv ,br )
30: end if
31: end if
32: end function
Fig. 25. Strong Inference Algorithm
F INVARIANT INFERENCE
Figures 25 and 26 present Leto’s loop invariant inference algorithm. Leto uses Houdini-style loop
invariant inference [Flanagan and Leino 2001] to reduce the annotation burden on the program-
mer.
Preliminaries. We denote a modified version of Leto’s verification algorithm by the function
Ψ
′, which is identical to Ψ except that it ignores calls to the Verify function.
The value r ∈ R = {sat, unsat, unknown} represents the response from the SMT solver Leto uses.
sat indicates that a satisfying assignment exists for all variables in the predicate. unsat indicates
that no satisfying assignment exists for all variables in the predicate. unknown indicates that the
SMT solver cannot determine whether a satisfying assignment exists.
The function Check is identical to the Verify function except that:
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1: functionWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m, c,bcv ,bcr ,bpv ,bpr ) =
2: match bcv do
3: bh :: b
′
cv :
4: if (c == lock) then
5: po ← vbexp(bv ,m, left) :: vbexp(bh ,m, left)
6: pr ← vbexp(bv ,m, right) :: vbexp(bh ,m, right)
7: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ :: po ,pr )
8: σc ← σ :: po :: pr :: vbexp(bpv ,m, left) :: vbexp(bpr ,m, right)
9: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: σo :: σr ,m, lock),po :: pr )
10: (r3,bf v 3,bf r 3) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: ¬σo :: σr ,m, right),pr )
11: if (r1 == unsat ∧ r2 == unsat ∧ r3 == unsat) then
12: returnWeakInf(while (b) (bh :: bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m, c,b
′
cv ,bcr ,bpv ,bpr )
13: else returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m,c,b
′
cv ,bcr ,bpv ,bpr )
14: end if
15: else if (c == right) then
16: p ← vbexp(bv ,m, right) :: vbexp(bh ,m, right), ppv ← vbexp(bpv ,m, right)
17: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ ,p)
18: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σ :: p :: σr :: ppv ,m, right), p)
19: if (r1 == unsat ∧ r2 == unsat) then
20: returnWeakInf(while (b) (bh :: bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m, c,b
′
cv ,bcr ,bpv ,bpr )
21: else returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m,c,b
′
cv ,bcr ,bpv ,bpr )
22: end if
23: end if
24: []:
25: match bcr do
26: []: return (bv ,br )
27: bh :: b
′
cr :
28: if (c == lock) then
29: po ← vbexp(bv ,m, left), pr ← vbexp(bv ,m, right)
30: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ :: po ,br :: bh :: pr )
31: σc ← σ :: po :: pr :: br :: bh :: vbexp(bpv ,m, left) :: vbexp(bpr ,m, right)
32: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: σo :: σr ,m, lock),po :: pr :: br :: bh)
33: (r3,bf v 3,bf r 3) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σc :: ¬σo :: σr ,m, right),pr :: br :: bh )
34: if (r1 == unsat ∧ r2 == unsat ∧ r3 == unsat) then
35: returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br :: bh) {sb },σ ,m, c,bcv ,b
′
cr ,bpv ,bpr )
36: else returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m,c,bcv ,b
′
cr ,bpv ,bpr )
37: end if
38: else if (c == right) then
39: p ← vbexp(bv ,m, right), ppv ← vbexp(bpv ,m, right)
40: (r1,bf v 1,bf r 1) ← Check(σ ,p :: br :: bh)
41: (r2,bf v 2,bf r 2) ← Check(Ψ
′(sb ,σ :: p :: br :: bh :: σr :: ppv ,m, right), p :: br :: bh)
42: if (r1 == unsat ∧ r2 == unsat) then
43: returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br :: bh) {sb },σ ,m, c,bcv ,b
′
cr ,bpv ,bpr )
44: else returnWeakInf(while (b) (bv ) (br ) {sb },σ ,m,c,bcv ,b
′
cr ,bpv ,bpr )
45: end if
46: end if
47: end match
48: end match
49: end function
Fig. 26. Weak Inference Algorithm
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• Check(σ1,σ2) does not halt execution if σ1 does not imply σ2.
• Check returns a tuple consisting of:
– An SMT result r ∈ R.
– A set of false conjuncts from the loop invariant bv .
– A set of false conjuncts from the relational invariant br .
Strong Inference. Figure 25 presents the strong inference algorithm. Before checking a loop,
Leto assembles the candidate invariants
bv ≡ pv
br ≡ pr ∧
( ∧
x ∈vars
xr = xo
)
where pv is the invariant for the immediate parent loop or function, pr is the relational invariant
for the immediate parent loop or function, and vars is the set of program variables currently in
scope.
Leto replaces the programmer provided invariants in the loop with bv and br and invokes the
Inf function. It also provides the Inf function with the programmer provided invariant as bpv and
the programmer provided relational invariant as bpr . Leto uses these invariants as assumptions
during the inference process. The algorithm has a different behavior for each of the verification
modes:
• Lockstep. The beginning of the lockstep algorithm (Lines 4 through 8) is similar to the
lockstep case for while loop verification, but we’ve replaced all invocations of Verify with
invocations of Check and all applications of Ψ with applications of Ψ′.
The algorithm proceeds in three possible ways based on the results of the Check function:
– If any of the three Check results is unknown, then Leto falls back on its weak inference
algorithm (Line 10).
– If any of the three Check results is sat, the Inf function recurses with false conjuncts
removed from bv and br (Lines 12 through 14).
– If all three of the Check results are unsat, then the algorithm has converged on a set of
invariants and returns (bv ,br ) (Line 16).
• Left. In left mode Leto does no invariant inference due to the fact that Leto does not verify
loop invariants in left mode.
• Right. The beginning of the right algorithm (Lines 19 through 21) is similar to the right case
for while loop verification, but we’ve replaced all invocations of Verify with invocations of
Check and all applications of Ψ with applications of Ψ′.
The algorithm proceeds in three possible ways based on the results of the Check function:
– If any of the two Check results is unknown, then Leto falls back on its weak inference
algorithm (Line 23).
– If any of the two Check results is sat, the Inf function recurses with false conjuncts re-
moved from bv and br (Lines 25 through 27).
– If both of the Check results are unsat, then the algorithm has converged on a set a invari-
ants and returns (bv ,br ) (Line 29).
Weak Inference. Figure 26 presents the weak inference algorithm. Leto falls back on this al-
gorithm when any call to the SMT solver returns unknown. While the strong inference algorithm
iteratively prunes a set of candidate invariants, the weak inference algorithm builds up a set of
invariants one at a time from a set of candidates. This is inherently weaker than the strong infer-
ence algorithm as it cannot always infer invariants that depend on other invariants. TheWeakInf
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function takes these candidates as parameters (bcv for standard invariants and bcr for relational
invariants) in addition to the loop to perform inference over and the programmer provided invari-
ants for that loop.
The weak inference algorithm operates in three stages:
• Standard invariant inference (Lines 4 through 23). Leto adds the head of the standard
candidate invariant list (bh) to the loop invariant then proceeds differently depending on the
verification mode:
– Lockstep. The beginning of the lockstep algorithm (Lines 5 through 10) is similar to the
lockstep case for while loop verification, but we’ve replaced all invocations of Verify with
invocations of Check and all applications of Ψ with applications of Ψ′ and added the head
of the candidate invariant list at each step.
The algorithm proceeds in two possible ways based on the results of the Check function:
∗ If all three of the Check results are unsat, then the algorithm recurses with bh appended
to bv and the tail of bcv as the candidate invariant list (Line 12).
∗ If any of the three Check results are not unsat, then the algorithm discards the candidate
invariant and recurses (Line 13).
– Left. In left mode Leto does no invariant inference due to the fact that Leto does not verify
loop invariants in left mode.
– Right. The beginning of the right algorithm (Lines 16 through 18) is similar to the right
case for while loop verification, but we’ve replaced all invocations of Verify with invoca-
tions of Check and all applications of Ψ with applications of Ψ′ and added the head of the
candidate invariant list at each step.
The algorithm proceeds in two possible ways based on the results of the Check function:
∗ If both of the Check results are unsat, then the algorithm recurses with bh appended to
bv and the tail of bcv as the candidate invariant list (Line 20).
∗ If any of the two Check results are not unsat, then the algorithm discards the candidate
invariant and recurses (Line 21).
• Relational invariant inference (Lines 28 through 46). After exhausting the standard
candidate invariant list, Leto iterates through the relational candidate invariant list. This
process is identical to the previous stage but uses bcr in place of bcv .
• Base case (Line 26). When no candidate invariants remain, WeakInf returns the pair of
invariants (bv ,br ).
G SELF-CORRECTING CONNECTED COMPONENTS
Figure 27 presents an implementation of self-correcting connected components (SC-CC) [Sao et al.
2016], an iterative algorithm that computes the connected components of an input graph. A con-
nected component is a subgraph in which every pair of vertices in the subgraph is connected
through some path, but no vertex is connected to another vertex that is not also in the subgraph.
The standard connected components algorithm begins by constructing a vectorCC0 and initial-
izing this vector such that ∀v .CC0[v] = v . Then, on iteration i for each nodev the algorithm looks
up the value of each of v’s neighbors in CCi−1 and sets CCi [v] to the minimum of its neighbors
and CCi−1[v]. In other words,
CCi [v] = min
j∈N(v)
CCi−1[j] (1)
whereN(v) is the union ofv and the neighbors of nodev . The algorithm iterates this process until
no elements in CC are updated at which point it has converged.
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Self-correcting connected components adds an additional step of checking CCi after each iter-
ation to verify that it is valid and has not been corrupted by memory errors. If SC-CC detects an
error at CCi [v], it repeats the computation for node v with reliably backed storage.
Our implementation allows errors when writing CCi so long as the errors are sufficiently large.
Therefore, we considerCCi to be valid if∀v . 0 ≤ CCi [v] < |V | and in all other cases SC-CC corrects
the invalid positions. When this property holds, then after each iteration CC<o> == CC<r>, even
though intermediate values may differ during faulty execution.
The original SC-CC algorithm described by Sao et al. contains an additional data structure P*
and permits a larger class of errors than this implementation does. However, this flexibility comes
at a cost: the original algorithm is not guaranteed to converge. As such, we modified the algorithm
to prove strong convergence properties that the oringal does not provide.
Self Correction. SC-CC is self correcting. This means that given some valid state, SC-CC can
correct errors encountered during each iteration. In this case, if an error occurs at iteration i , SC-
CC can correct CCi using data from CCi−1. Therefore, SC-CC always stores CC for the previous
iteration correctly. This is weaker than self-stabilizing algorithms which may correct themselves
from any state and do not rely on certain state elements remaining uncorrupted.
G.1 SC-CC Implementation
The overall structure of the SC-CC implementation is as follows:
• Initialization.The cc function takes a description of a graph in the formof an adjacencyma-
trix (adj). It then declares and initializes CC, which holds the result of the previous iteration.
It also declares next_CC, which holds the result of the current iteration, in the unreliable
memory region.
• Outer while loop (Line 9) The outer while loop computes the next iteration of CC. It con-
verges when the algorithm makes no changes to CC over the course of a single iteration.
• Faulty step (Line 15) The faulty step computes Equation 1 element-wise over next_CC.
The inner loop allows errors during writes to next_CC, which SC-CC will correct in the
correction step. Prior to the entrance of the outer loop, SC-CC sets the model.reliable to
false to permit errors (Line 14).
• Correction step (Line 31) The correction step detects and corrects errors in next_CC. First,
it sets the model.reliable flag to true to prevent further errors in this iteration (Line 30).
If next_CC contains an error at index v, the implementation reliably computes next_CC[v]
using Equation 1. After correcting next_CC, the implementation sets CC equal to next_CC
and begins the next iteration.
Constants andProperties. SC-CC uses the following constants and properties, found in Figure 28:
• max_N (Line 1). This constant bounds the maximum number of nodes an input graph may
contain.
• vec_bound (Line 3). This property takes a vector V and an index i and stipulates that ∀ j <
i<o>. V<o>[j] ≤ j.
• large_error_r (Line 6). This property takes a vector V and an index i and asserts that
∀ j < i<r>. V<r>[j] = V<o>[j]∨ j < V<r>[j].
• large_error_r_inclusive (Line 10). This property takes a vector V, an index from, an
index to and asserts that ∀ i. (from<r> ≤ i < to<r>) → V<r>[i] = V<o>[i] ∨ i <
V<r>[i].
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1 requires N < max_N requires_r eq(adj)
2 vector <uint > cc(uint N, matrix <uint > adj(N, N)) {
3 vector <uint > CC(N);
4 @region(unreliable ) vector <uint > next_CC(N);
5
6 for (uint v = 0; v < N; ++v) invariant_r vec_bound (CC, v) {CC[v] = v;}
7 uint N_s = N;
8
9 @noinf while (0 < N_s)
10 invariant N < max_N
11 invariant_r vec_bound (CC , N)
12 invariant_r eq(N) && eq(adj) && eq(N_s) && eq(CC) {
13
14 next_CC = CC; N_s = 0; model.reliable = false;
15 for (uint v = 0; v < N; ++v)
16 invariant_r vec_bound (next_CC , N)
17 invariant_r large_error_r (next_CC , N)
18 invariant_r ∀(uint fi)((v<o><=fi <N<o>) -> next_CC <o>[fi]==CC <o>[fi])
19 invariant_r outer_spec (v<o>, N<o>, next_CC <o>, CC <o>, adj <o>) {
20
21 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j)
22 invariant v < N && N < max_N
23 invariant_r ∀(uint fi )((v<o><fi <N<o>) -> next_CC <o>[fi]==CC<o>[fi])
24 invariant_r inner_spec (j<o>, v<o>, next_CC <o>, CC <o>, adj <o>) {
25 if (CC[j] < next_CC[v] && next_CC[v] <= v && adj[v][j] == 1) {
26 next_CC[v] = CC[j];
27 }
28 }
29 }
30 model.reliable = true ;
31 @noinf @label(outer_correction ) for (uint v = 0; v < N; ++v)
32 invariant_r outer_spec (v<r>, N<r>, next_CC <r>, CC <r>, adj <r>)
33 invariant_r eq(N) && eq(CC) && eq(adj) && eq(v) && eq(N_s)
34 invariant_r forall(uint fi)((( fi < v<r>) ->
35 (next_CC <r>[fi] == next_CC <o>[fi ])))
36 invariant_r vec_bound (next_CC , N)
37 invariant_r model.reliable
38 invariant_r large_error_r_inclusive (next_CC , v, N)
39 invariant_r outer_spec (N<o>, N<o>, next_CC <o>, CC <o>, adj <o>) {
40 if (v < corrected_next_CC [v]) {
41 next_CC[v] = CC[v];
42 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j)
43 invariant v < N && v < outer_correction [next_CC[v]]
44 invariant_r inner_spec (j<r> , v<r>, next_CC <r> CC<r>, adj <r>)
45 invariant_r large_error_r_exclusive (next_CC , v, N) {
46 if (CC[j] < next_CC[v] && adj[v][j] == 1) { next_CC[v] = CC[j]; }
47 }
48 }
49 if (next_CC[v] < CC[v]) {++N_s;}
50 }
51 CC = corrected_next_CC ;
52 }
53 return CC;
54 }
Fig. 27. Self-Correcting Connected Components
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1 const real max_N = ..;
2
3 property_r vec_bound (vector <uint> V, uint i) :
4 forall(uint j)((j < i<o>) -> (V<o>[j] <= j));
5
6 property_r large_error_r (vector <uint > V, uint i) :
7 forall(uint j)((j < i<r>) ->
8 (V<r>[j] == V<o>[j] || j < V<r>[j]));
9
10 property_r large_error_r_inclusive(vector <uint> V, uint from , uint to) :
11 forall(uint j)((from <r> <= j < to<r>) ->
12 (V<r>[j] == V<o>[j] || j < V<r>[j]));
13
14 property_r large_error_r_exclusive(vector <uint> V, uint from , uint to) :
15 forall(uint j)((from <r> < j < to<r>) ->
16 (V<r>[j] == V<o>[j] || j < V<r>[j]));
17
18 property_r outer_spec (uint to , uint N, vector <uint> next_CC ,
19 vector <uint> CC , matrix <uint> adj) :
20 forall(uint fi)((fi < to) ->
21 (forall(uint fj)((fj < N && adj[fi][fj] == 1) ->
22 next_CC[fi] <= CC[fj]) &&
23 next_CC[fi] <= CC[fi] &&
24 (exists(uint ej)( next_CC[fi] == CC[ej] && ej < N &&
25 adj[fi][ej] == 1) ||
26 next_CC[fi] == CC[fi])));
27
28 property_r inner_spec (uint to , uint v, uint N, vector <uint> next_CC ,
29 vector <uint> CC , matrix <uint> adj) :
30 forall(uint fi)((fi < to && adj[v][fi] == 1) ->
31 next_CC[v] <= CC[fi]) &&
32 next_CC[v] <= CC[v] &&
33 (exists(uint ei)(next_CC[v] == CC[ei] && ei < N &&
34 adj[v][ei] == 1) ||
35 next_CC[v] == CC[v]);
Fig. 28. Constant and Properties for Self-Correcting Connected Components
• large_error_r_exclusive (Line 14). This property takes a vector V, an index from, an
index to and asserts that ∀ i. (from<r> < i < to<r>) → V<r>[i] = V<o>[i] ∨ i <
V<r>[i].
• outer_spec (Line 18). This property takes an index to, a size N, a vector next_CC, a vector
CC, and an adjacency matrix adj. It ensures that every element of next_CC from index 0 to
index to (exclusive) satisfies Equation 1.
• inner_spec (Line 28). This property takes an index to, an index v, a size N, a vector next_-
CC, a vector CC, and an adjacencymatrix adj. It ensures that next_CC[v] satisfies Equation 1
up to the neighbor at index to. That is,
next_CC[v] = min
j∈N(v, to)
CC[j]
where N(v, to) is the union of v and the neighbors of node v up to (but not including)
nodes with the id to.
Error Model. I evaluate SC-CC under the switchable rowhammer fault model from Figure 5.
Thismodel provides two implementations for thewrite operator in thememory region unreliable.
The first implementation is fully reliable while the second allows for errors so long as they are
larger than the programmer specified constant min_error.
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I use this fault model that allows only faulty writes because it captures all possible rowhammer
attacks over high order bits in the elements of next_CC. A rowhammer attack allows an attacker to
selectively flip bits in DRAM by issuing frequent reads on DRAM rows surrounding the row under
attack [Kim et al. 2014]. This drains capacitors in the attacked row and therefore permanently flips
bits in that row. As empty capacitors may indicate a 0 or 1 depending on location on the chip, this
attack does not always flip bits from 1 to 0. Although researchers have devised protections to ad-
dress rowhammer attacks [Kim et al. 2015, 2014], the JDEC Solid State TechnologyAssociation did
not include these protections in the DDR4 standard [Association et al. 2012] and Mark Lanteigne
has demonstrated rowhammer attacks on some DDR4 memory [Lanteigne 2016].
Given that some regions of memory may be more vulnerable to rowhammer attacks than oth-
ers [Kim et al. 2014], I place next_CC in an unreliable region prone to attacks (Line 4) and all other
variables in reliable memory.
G.2 Specification
We use Leto’s specification abilities to verify the error detection, self-correction, and convergence
properties of SC-CC.
Perfect Error Detection. To verify that this SC-CC implementation detects all errors, the de-
veloper must verify that N < max_N, where N is the number of nodes in the input graph and max_N
is a programmer specified value bounding the maximum graph size a calling function may pro-
vide. The developer must also ensure that max_N is less than the magnitude of the largest error
they expect to encounter. This property ensures that any error will be larger than N, which in turn
ensures that SC-CC detects all errors as errors result in trivially invalid values. SC-CC specifies
this property as a unary prerequisite to calling the cc function on Line 1. It also specifies this
property as unary invariants that must hold before and after each loop iteration on Lines 10 and
22. Although not explicitly stated, Leto infers this invariant for the loop on Line 15.
Error detection also requires that impact of errors on next_CC<r> is large enough to be detected.
Specifically, it is necessary that
∀i . next_CC<r>[i] > i ∨ next_CC<r> == next_CC<o>.
This property ensures that for every element e of next_CC<r> at index i , e is in one of two states:
• Detectable Error.When e > i , e violates the property that every element ofCC does not in-
crease from its initialization value. The check in the conditional on Line 40 of the correction
step trivially detects this error.
• Equality.When e = next_CC<o>[i], e is correctly computed.
Note that e can not be in a state where it contains an undetectable error. Loop invariants on Lines 17
and 38 (large_error_r(next_CC, N)) ensure this property.
The final property SC-CC requires to ensure that it has perfect error detection is eq(adj). This
property asserts that the graphs both executions operate over are equivalent, and unable to experi-
ence errors. SC-CC enforces this property by specifying it as a requirement to call the cc function
on Line 1. On all loops it either explicitly specify eq(adj), or Leto infers it.
Self-Correction. To verify that SC-CC is self correcting, the implementation first verifies that
every element of next_CC<o> satisfies Equation 1. It capture this with the outer_spec property
application on Line 19 and the inner_spec property application on Line 24. Both of these proper-
ties capture the semantics of the min operator. After exiting inner faulty loop (j == N), inner_-
spec(j<o>, v<o>, next_CC<o>, CC<o>, adj<o>) is equivalent to Equation 1 at index v . Simi-
larly, after exiting the outer loop (v == N), the application outer_spec(v<o>, N<o>, next_CC<o>,
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CC<o>, adj<o>) is equivalent to Equation 1 at all indices, or
∀v . CCi [v] = min
j∈N(v)
CCi−1[j].
The correction step applies the same two properties (outer_spec and inner_spec) in the same
fashion to specify that next_CC<r> also satisfies Equation 1 at all indices.
SC-CC passes the specification of next_CC<o> into the correction loop on Line 39 where Leto
combines it with the specification of next_CC<r> to prove that
∀i < v<r>. next_CC<r>[i] == next_CC<o>[i],
stated on Line 34.
Finally, with the assignment CC = next_CC Leto can verify the outer loop invariant eq(CC)
(Line 12) thus proving that SC-CC is self correcting.
Convergence Equality. Given that SC-CC is self correcting and detects all errors, it is trivial to
see that both executions converge in the same number of iterations. That is, the outer while loop
(Line 9) must run in lockstep. To demonstrate this fact to Leto SC-CC uses the eq(N_s) invariant
on Lines 12 and 33.
N_s itself is updated in two places:
• Line 14. SC-CC sets N_s to 0 at the top of the outer loop. As N_s is stored in reliable memory,
it is clear that N_s<o> == N_s<r>.
• Line 49. SC-CC increments N_s at this location if next_CC[v] < CC[v]. From the surround-
ing loop invariants Leto knows that
next_cc<o>[v<o>] == next_CC<r>[v<r>]
and
CC<o>[v<o>] == CC<r>[v<r>]
so the if statement must execute in lockstep. Therefore, if N_s was equal across both execu-
tions before the if statement, then it is equal afterwards as the implementations performs
the increment to N_s reliably.
Leto realizes that N_s is equal across both executions after both assignments and therefore
eq(N_s) must hold in both loop invariants. This forces the outer while loop into a lockstep ex-
ecution and proves that convergence time is equal under relaxed and reliable execution semantics.
G.3 Verification Approach
I next demonstrate how the developer works with Leto to verify that the implementation meets
these specifications.
Precondition. The verification algorithm begins with the preconditions on cc. The precon-
dition stipulates that N be less than max_N and that the graph be equal across both executions
(eq(adj)). Leto adds these preconditions as assumptions to its context.
Initialization. On Line 6 SC-CC initializes the CC vector such that ∀v. CC[v] = v. The loop
invariant verifies that all elements with index v in CC are between 0 and v. This property is critical
in the detection of errors and must hold for CC after each iteration of the connected components
algorithm.
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Outer Loop. The loop on Line 9 runs the iterative portion of the algorithm. The loop enforces
the critical invariants vec_bound(CC, N), which ensures that ∀v. CC[v] ≤ v, and eq(CC). It also
contains the invariant eq(N_s), which ensures that the loop runs in lockstep. Lastly, it enforces
the invariants eq(N) and eq(adj)which ensure that the input graph is identical across both exe-
cutions.
The loop also sports the @noinf annotation, which disables inference over this loop. SC-CC
disables inference on this loop because the inference algorithm’s time complexity is exponential
in the depth of nested loops.
FaultyMiddle Loop. Verification then proceeds to the faulty middle loop on Line 15. This loop
contains the following invariants:
• vec_bound(next_CC, N).This invariant enforces that elements of next_CC<o>are bounded
by their respective indices. This fact is important to pass on to the correction step as it im-
plies that the original execution never runs the inner correction loop.
• large_error_r(next_CC, N). This invariant enforces that errors to next_CC<r> are large
enough to be detected. It enables the implementation to detect and correct all errors during
the correction step.
• forall(uint fi)((v<o> <= fi < N<o>) -> next_CC<o>[fi] == CC<o>[fi]).
This invariant states that elements in next_CC that the implementation hasn’t yet updated
are still equal to CC. This is necessary as it communicates to Leto that if an element is not
updated on this iteration, then it is already the minimum of its neighbors.
• outer_spec(v<o>, N<o>, next_CC<o>, CC<o>, adj<o>). This invariant specifies the
contents of next_CC<o>. I use it to pass information about next_CC<o> on to the correction
step.
Faulty Inner Loop. Verification then continues to the loop on Line 21, where it encounters the
following invariants:
• v < N. This invariant bounds v so that Leto knows that the vector accesses within this loop
are in bounds.
• N < max_N. This invariant bounds the maximum size of the graph so that Leto knows that
errors are larger than the maximum graph size and are therefore detectable.
• forall(uint fi)((v<o> < fi < N<o>) -> next_CC<o>[fi] == CC<o>[fi]).
This invariant serves to pass on that although the implementation may have altered next_-
CC<o>[v<o>], the other elements that Leto previously knew were equal to CC<o> in the
middle faulty loop are still equal to CC<o>.
• inner_spec(j<o>, v<o>, next_CC<o>, CC<o>, adj<o>). This invariant specifies the
contents of next_CC<o>[v<o>]. It serves only to pass this information on to the outer loop
so Leto may verify the outer_spec invariant in that loop.
CorrectionMiddle Loop. Verification next proceeds to the loop on Line 31. This loop contains
the following notable invariants:
• outer_spec(v<r>, N<r>, next_CC<r>, CC<r>, adj<r>). This invariant specifies the
contents of next_CC<r>. Leto combines it with the other outer_spec invariant to verify
next_CC<o> == next_CC<r> after exiting the loop.
• eq(v). This invariant states that v<o> == v<r>. It informs Leto that this loop must run in
lockstep.
• forall(uint fi)(((0 <= fi < v<r>) -> (next_CC<r>[fi] == next_CC<o>[fi]))).
This invariant states that elements in next_CC that the implementation has updated are
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equal across both executions. This allows Leto to prove eq(CC) at the end of the outer while
loop.
• vec_bound(next_CC, N).This invariant enforces that elements of next_CC<o>are bounded
by their respective indices. This implies that the original execution never runs the inner cor-
rection loop. Therefore, Leto prunes any paths in which the original execution runs through
the inner loop.
• model.reliable.This invariant enforces that the correction step runs reliably.
• large_error_r_inclusive(next_CC, v, N).This invariant enforces that errors to next_-
CC<r> are large enough to be detected. It enables the implementation to detect and correct
all errors during the course of this loop.
• outer_spec(N<o>, N<o>, next_CC<o>, CC<o>, adj<o>). This invariant passes in the
specification for next_CC<o> from the faulty loop. Leto combines it with specifications over
next_CC<r> to prove that next_CC<o>[v<o>] is equivalent to next_CC<r>[v<r>]at the end
of the current loop iteration.
Correction Inner Loop. Verification then continues to the loop on Line 42 which contains
three developer specified invariants:
• v < N. This invariant bounds v so that Leto knows that the vector accesses within this loop
are in bounds.
• v < outer_correction[next_CC[v]].The syntax outer_correction[next_CC[v]]refers
to the value of next_CC[v] at the top of the loop labeled outer_correction.Therefore, this
invariant states that v is less than next_CC[v] at the top of the outer correction loop. The
conditional that contains this loop implies this invariant.
• large_error_r_exclusive(next_CC, v, N).This invariant enforces that errors to next_-
CC<r> are large enough to be detected. It enables the implementation to detect and correct
all errors during the course of this loop.
• inner_spec(j<r> , v<r>, corrected_next_CC<r> CC<r>, adj<r>). This invariant
specifies the contents of corrected_next_CC<r>[v<r>]. It serves only to pass this infor-
mation on to the outer loop so that Leto may verify the outer_spec in that loop.
H SELF-STABILIZING CONJUGATE GRADIENT DESCENT
Weuse Leto to verify an implementation of self-stabilizing conjugate gradient (SS-CG) [Sao and Vuduc
2013] and present relevant snippets required for verification below. Conjugate gradient descent
is another method for solving linear systems of equations. However, unlike Jacobi, the standard
conjugate gradient method is sensitive to errors that may corrupt internal state variables and,
therefore, is not naturally self-stabilizing. SS-CG employs a periodic correction step to recalculate
appropriate values for internal state variables from the current estimated solution vector x and the
input matrix A.
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The standard conjugate gradient descent algorithm computes the next iteration’s variables as
follows:
qi = Api (2)
αi =
rTi ri
pTi q
(3)
xi+1 = xi + αpi (4)
ri+1 = ri − αqi (5)
β =
rTi+1ri+1
rTi ri
(6)
pi+1 = ri+1 + βpi (7)
SS-CG adds a periodic correction step to repair state variables that may have been corrupted
by errors. Unlike the previous steps, the repair step must be computed reliably. This repair step
computes:
r ′i = Axi (8)
qi = Api (9)
ri = b − r
′
i (10)
αi =
rTi pi
pTi q
(11)
xi+1 = xi + αpi (12)
ri+1 = ri − αq (13)
β = −
rTi+1qi
pTi q
(14)
pi+1 = ri+1 + βpi (15)
We use Leto to verify two properties of SS-CG that are necessary for self-stability under the
SEU model we present in Figure 1:
• Reliable Correction Step. We verify that it is possible to correct errors even when the
matrix vector products in Equations 8 and 9 may experience faults. To accomplish this, the
implementation uses dual modular redundancy (DMR) to duplicate arithmetic instructions
and repeat the correction step until the result of both sets of instructions agree with each
other.
• Correctable Errors.We verify that errors in the matrix vector product from Equation 2 are
sufficiently small. Specifically, SS-CG requires that if an element of q is corrupted by ϵ , then
ϵ2 < max
i, j
(A[i][j])2.
We present the code snippet for the reliable correction step in Figure 29 and the snippet for
correctable errors in Figure 30. We have included the full implementation in Appendix J.
H.1 Implementation
H.1.1 Reliable Correction Step. The SS-CG correction step we present in Figure 29 operates
over the following pre-existing variables:
• A. A is a matrix of coefficients.
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1 property_r dmr_eq(vector <real > x1 , vector <real> x2 , vector <real> sx) :
2 !model.upset -> (x1<r> == sx && x2 <r> == sx);
3
4 property_r dmr_imp(vector <real > x1, vector <real > x2 , vector <real> sx) :
5 (x1 <r> == x2<r>) -> (x1 <r> == sx);
6
7 vector <real> r2(N), q2(N);
8 specvar vector <real> spec_r(N), spec_q(N);
9 r = r2 = spec_r = q = q2 = spec_q = zeros;
10 bool not_run = true;
11
12 @noinf while (not_run || r != r2 || q != q2)
13 invariant_r dmr_eq(r, r2 , spec_r)
14 invariant_r dmr_eq(q, q2 , spec_q)
15 invariant_r dmr_imp(r, r2 , spec_r)
16 invariant_r dmr_imp(q, q2 , spec_q)
17 {
18 not_run = false;
19
20 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
21 {
22 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j)
23 {
24 real tmp = A[i][j] *. x[j];
25 real tmp2 = A[i][j] *. x[j];
26 specvar real spec_tmp = A[i][j] * x[j];
27 r[i] = r[i] +. tmp;
28 r2[i] = r2[i] +. tmp2;
29 spec_r[i] = spec_r[i] + spec_tmp;
30
31 tmp = A[i][j] *. p[j];
32 tmp2 = A[i][j] *. p[j];
33 spec_tmp = A[i][j] * p[j];
34 q[i] = q[i] +. tmp;
35 q2[i] = q2[i] +. tmp2;
36 spec_q[i] = spec_q[i] + spec_tmp;
37 }
38 }
39 }
40
41 assert_r (! outer_while [model.upset] -> (r<r> == spec_r));
42 assert_r (! outer_while [model.upset] -> (q<r> == spec_q));
Fig. 29. SS-CG Correction Step
• x. x is a solution vector.
• r. r holds the residual of the current iteration.
• p and q. p and q are vectors of loop carried state.
The overall structure of the SS-CG correction step is as follows:
• Initialization (Line 7). Initialization declares the following variables:
– r2 and q2. The algorithm computes r2 according to Equation 8 and q2 according to
Equation 9. It then uses r2 and q2 to verify that it has correctly computed r and q re-
spectively.
– spec_r and spec_q. spec_r and spec_q are specification variables that also compute
Equation 8 and Equation 9 respectively. Unlike r, r2, q, and q2, the implementation com-
putes these specification variables reliably.
– Outer while loop (Line 12). The outer while loop repeats the correction step until r ==
r2 and q == q2.
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1 const real M = ...;
2
3 property_r sqr_lt(vector <real > v, uint i) :
4 ((v<r>[i<r>] - v<o>[i<o>]) * (v<r>[i<r>] - v<o>[i<o>])) < M;
5
6 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
7 {
8
9 q[i] = 0;
10 @label(inner_err )
11 for (int j = 0; j < N; ++j)
12 invariant_r (!model.upset && eq(p)) -> q<r>[i<r>] == q<o>[i<o>]
13 {
14 real tmp = A[i][j] *. p[j];
15 q[i] = q[i] +. tmp;
16
17 assert_r ((! inner_err [model.upset] && eq(p)) -> sqr_lt(q, i));
18 }
19 }
Fig. 30. SS-CG Faulty Matrix Vector Product
– Middle for loop (Line 20). The middle for loop computes Equation 8 element-wise for r,
r2, and spec_r and Equation 9 element-wise for q, q2, and spec_q.
– Inner for loop (Line 22). The inner for loop computes the matrix vector products:
r = A * x
q = A * p
It computes r2 and spec_r similarly to r, and q2 and spec_q similarly to q. The algorithm
permits errors in the computation of r, r2, q, and q2, but not in spec_r or spec_q.
Properties. The SS-CG correction step implementation uses the following properties, found in
Figure 29:
• dmr_eq (Line 1). This property asserts that if an upset has not occurred, then x1 and x2 are
both equal to the specification variable sx.
• dmr_imp (Line 4). This property asserts that if x1 and x2 are equal, then x1 is equal to the
specification variable sx.
H.1.2 FaultyMatrix Vector Product. The SS-CG faultymatrix vector product I present in Figure 30
operates over the following pre-existing variables:
• A. A is a matrix of coefficients.
• p and q. p and q are vectors of loop carried state.
The structure of the SS-CG faulty matrix vector product is as follows:
• Outer for loop (Line 6). The outer for loop computes Equation 2 element-wise over q.
• Inner for loop (Line 11). The inner for loop computes the unreliable matrix vector product
q = A * p.
Constants and Properties. The SS-CG faulty matrix vector product uses the following con-
stants properties, found in Figure 30:
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• M (Line 1). M represents the maximum square error permissible in a single element of q. The
developer must set it according to the formula
M < min
a∈A
(
max
(i, j)
(a[i][j])2
)
where A is the set of A input matrices the developer expects to run our implementation over.
• sqr_lt (Line 3). sqr_lt takes a vector v, and index i, and ensures that the square error of
v[i] is strictly less than M. In other words, it mandates that
(v<r>[i<r>]− v<o>[i<o>])2 < M.
H.2 Specification
We use Leto’s specification abilities to verify the error correction and small errors properties of
SS-CG.
Error Correction. Using DMR, the correction step corrects r and q even in the presence of
errors. SS-CG enforces this property through the assertions on Lines 41 and 42 of Figure 29. As
the algorithm computes spec_r and spec_q correctly, Leto knows that if r<r> == spec_r and
q<r> == spec_q, then the system has computed r<r> and q<r> correctly.
The dmr_imp and dmr_eq property applications in the outer while loop invariants (Lines 13
through 16) pass the information Leto needs to verify this assertion out of the loop. Leto infers
these invariants for the inner loops, thus allowing the outer loop to verify that the invariant holds
after the modifications the inner loop performs.
Correctable Errors. Under SEU, SS-CG requires that if an element of q is corrupted by ϵ , then
ϵ2 < max
(i, j)
(A[i][j])2. (16)
SS-CG enforces this property through the assertion on Line 17 of Figure 30. The invariant on
Line 12 enforces the complementary invariant that if no error occurred, then q<r>[i<r>] is equal
to q<o>[i<o>]. eq(p) guards both of these constraints because the implementation verifies this
section in isolation without specifying the global properties of p. However, if no upset occurred
prior to the start of this section then eq(p) trivially holds before and throughout as this snippet
does not modify p.
H.3 Verification Approach
Next, we demonstrate how the developer works with Leto to verify that the implementation meets
these specifications.
H.3.1 Correction Step.
Outer Loop. Verification begins with the loop on Line 12 of Figure 29. This loop contains the
following invariants:
• dmr_eq(r, r2, spec_r).This invariant enforces that in the absence of errors during a loop
iteration, r<r> is equal to spec_r. That is, if no errors occur then r is correct. This fact is
important to pass on so that Leto may verify the assertions on Line 41.
• dmr_eq(q, q2, spec_q).This invariant enforces that in the absence of errors during a loop
iteration, q<r> is equal to spec_q. That is, if no errors occur then q is correct. This fact is
important to pass on so that Leto may verify the assertions on Line 42.
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• dmr_imp(r, r2, spec_r). This invariant states that if the duplicated r variables are equal
to each other, then r is also equal to spec_r. Combining this with the loop condition, Leto
knows that r<r> == spec_r after exiting the loop.
• dmr_imp(q, q2, spec_q). This invariant states that if the duplicated q variables are equal
to each other, then q is also equal to spec_q. Combining this with the loop condition, Leto
knows that q<r> == spec_q after exiting the loop.
Assertions. Verification concludes with the assertions on Lines 41 and 42:
• !outer_while[model.upset] - > (r<r> == spec_r). This assertion verifies that if no
upset occurred prior to entering the loop containing the outer while loop, then the correction
step computed r correctly.
• !outer_while[model.upset] - > (q<r> == spec_q). This assertion verifies that if no
upset occurred prior to entering the loop containing the outer while loop, then the correction
step computed q correctly.
H.3.2 Faulty Matrix Vector Product.
Outer Loop. Verification begins with the loop on Line 6 of Figure 30. This loop contains no
invariants.
Inner Loop. Verification then proceeds to the inner loop on Line 11. This loop contains the
following invariants:
• (!model.upset && eq(p)) -> q<r>[i<r>] == q<o>[i<o>]. This invariant ensures that
if no upset occurred and p<o> == p<r>, then q[i] is equal across both executions.
Assertion. Verification concludes with the assertion on Line 17. This assertion verifies that if
no error had occurred prior to the top of the inner loop, and p<o> == p<r>, then the square
difference between q<o> and q<r> is less than M. This ensures that errors are sufficiently small to
be correctable. That is, it ensures that the error in q satisfies Equation 16.
I SELF-STABILIZING STEEPEST DESCENT CORRECTION STEP
Figure 31 presents an implementation of the correction step from self-stabilizing steepest descent
(SS-SD) [Sao and Vuduc 2013]. SS-SD is an iterative algorithm that computes the solution to a
linear system of equations. It takes as input a matrix of coefficients A, a vector b of intercepts, and
returns an approximate solution vector x such that A ∗ x ≈ b. On each iteration, steepest descent
uses ri , xi , and A to compute ri+1 and xi+1 as follows:
qi = Ari (17)
αi =
rTi ri
rTi qi
(18)
xi+1 = xi + αiri (19)
ri+1 = ri − αiqi (20)
SS-SD adds a periodic correction step to repair the residual r of any errors it may have incurred.
This repair step computes
ri = b −Ax . (21)
Unlike Equation 18 through Equation 20, SS-SD requires that Equation 21 is performed reliably.
Therefore, the implementation verifies that it is possible to correct errors under the SEU execution
model from Figure 1 even when the error correction step may experience errors. To accomplish
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1 vector <real> correct_sd (int N, matrix <real > A(N, N),
2 vector <real > b(N), vector <real > x(N))
3 {
4 vector <real> zeros(N);
5 @noinf for (int i = 0; i < N; ++i) { zeros[i] = 0; }
6
7 vector <real> r(N), r2(N);
8 specvar vector <real> spec_r(N);
9 spec_r = r;
10 bool run = false;
11
12 @noinf @label(outer) while (run == false || r != r2)
13 invariant_r r<r> == r2 <r> -> r<r> == spec_r
14 {
15 model.upset = false;
16 run = true;
17
18 vector <real > Ax(N), Ax2(N);
19 specvar vector <real > spec_Ax(N);
20 Ax = Ax2 = spec_Ax = r = r2 = spec_r = zeros;
21
22 @noinf for (int i = 0; i < N; ++i)
23 invariant_r upset(r, r2 , spec_r , Ax , Ax2 , spec_Ax)
24 {
25
26 @noinf for (int j = 0; j < N; ++j)
27 invariant_r upset(r, r2 , spec_r , Ax , Ax2 , spec_Ax)
28 {
29
30 real tmp = A[i][j] *. x[j];
31 real tmp2 = A[i][j] *. x[j];
32 specvar real spec_tmp = A[i][j] * x[j];
33
34 Ax[i] = Ax[i] +. tmp;
35 Ax2[i] = Ax2[i] +. tmp2;
36 spec_Ax[i] = spec_Ax[i] + tmp;
37 }
38
39 r[i] = b[i] -. Ax[i];
40 r2[i] = b[i] -. Ax2[i];
41 spec_r[i] = b[i] - spec_Ax[i];
42 }
43 }
44
45 assert_r (r<r> == spec_r);
46
47 return r;
48 }
Fig. 31. SS-SD Correction Step
this, we use dual modular redundancy (DMR) to duplicate arithmetic instructions and repeat the
correction step until the result of both sets of instructions agree with each other.
I.1 SS-SD Correction Step Implementation
The overall structure of the SS-SD correction step is as follows:
• Initialization. The correct_sd function takes a matrix of coefficients A, a vector of inter-
cepts b, and a solution vector x. It then declares:
– r. r holds the residual that will be returned.
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1 property_r upset(vector <real > r, vector <real> r2 , vector <real > spec_r ,
2 vector <real > Ax , vector <real> Ax2 , vector <real> spec_Ax ):
3 (model.upset ->
4 ((r<r> == spec_r && Ax <r> == spec_Ax) ||
5 (r2<r> == spec_r && Ax2 <r> == spec_Ax ))) &&
6 (!model.upset ->
7 (r<r> == spec_r && r2 <r> == spec_r &&
8 Ax <r> == spec_Ax && Ax2 <r> == spec_Ax ));
Fig. 32. SS-SD Properties
– r2. The function computes r2 according to Equation 21. The algorithm uses r2 to verify
that it has correctly computed r.
– spec_r. spec_r is a specification variable that also computes Equation 21. Unlike r and
r2, the implementation computes spec_r correctly.
• Outer while loop (Line 12). The outer while loop repeats the correction step until r == r2.
This loop also sets model.upset to false (Line 15) to permit at most one fault per correction
iteration.
• Middle for loop (Line 22). The middle for loop computes Equation 21 element-wise for
r, r2, and spec_r. The algorithm permits errors in the computation of r and r2 but not
spec_r.
• Inner for loop (Line 26). The inner for loop computes the matrix vector product Ax = A∗x.
It computes Ax2 and spec_Ax similarly. The algorithm permits errors in the computation of
Ax and Ax2, but not in spec_Ax.
Properties. The SS-SD correction step implementation uses the following properties, found in
Figure 32:
• upset (Line 1). This property consists of two conjuncts:
– The first conjunct states that if there was an upset since the start of the outer loop then at
least one of the duplicated computations is correct. That is, r<r> == spec_r && Ax<r>
== spec_Ax or r2<r> == spec_r && Ax2<r> == spec_Ax.
– The second conjunct states that if no upset has occurred since the toop of the outer loop
then both sets of duplicated instructions are correct.
I.2 Specification
Leto’s specification abilities verify the error correction property of SS-SD’s correction step.
Error Correction. Using DMR, the correction step corrects r even in the presence of errors.
SS-SD enforces this property through the assertion on Line 45. As the algorithm computes spec_r
correctly, if r<r> == spec_r, then r<r> is the correct residual.
The invariant on the outer while loop passes the information needed to verify this assertion out
of the loop. In turn, this invariant relies on the upset invariant in the middle loop (Line 23), which
iteself relies on the upset invariant in the inner loop (Line 27).
I.3 Verification Approach
Next, we demonstrate how the developer works with Leto to verify that the implementation meets
these specifications.
Outer Loop. Verification begins with the loop on Line 12. This loop contains the following
invariants:
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• r<r> == r2<r> -> r<r> == spec_r. This invariant states that if the duplicated r vari-
ables are equal to each other, then r is also equal to spec_r. Therefore, Leto knows that
r<r> == spec_r after exiting the loop.
Middle Loop. Verification then proceeds to the middle loop on Line 22. This loop contains the
following invariants:
• upset(r, r2, spec_r, Ax, Ax2, spec_Ax). This invariant enforces that in the event
of an error during this outer loop iteration, the algorithm computes at least one of set of
instructions (r and Ax or r2 and Ax2) correctly. Otherwise, the algorithm computes both
sets correctly. It is an invariant in the middle loop because it must hold at the top of the
inner loop.
Inner Loop. Verification then proceeds to the inner loop on Line 26. This loop contains the
following invariants:
• upset(r, r2, spec_r, Ax, Ax2, spec_Ax). This invariant enforces that in the event
of an error during this outer loop iteration, the algorithm computes at least one of set of
instructions (r and Ax or r2 and Ax2) correctly. Otherwise, the algorithm computes both
sets correctly. This invariant captures information about the impacts of errors on variables
modified in the inner loop and passes this information back to the middle loop.
Assertion. Verification concludes with the assertion on Line 45. This assertion verifies that
r<r> == spec_r, which enforces that r<r> is the correct residual and it satisfies Equation 21.
J FULL SELF-STABILIZING CONJUGATE GRADIENT DESCENT IMPLEMENTATION
We present our full implementation for self-stabilizing conjugate gradient descent below. We use
the @noinf annotation regularly in this benchmark on loops that do not contribute to the final
verification restult to increase performance.
1 const real SQR_MIN_MAX_AIJ = 2;
2
3 property_r sqr_lt(vector <real> v, uint i) :
4 ((q<r>[i<r>] - q<o>[i<o>]) * (q<r>[i<r>] - q<o>[i<o>])) <
5 SQR_MIN_MAX_AIJ;
6
7 property_r dmr_eq(vector <real> x1 ,
8 vector <real> x2 ,
9 vector <real> spec_x) :
10 !model.upset -> x1 <r> == spec_x && x2 <r> == spec_x;
11
12 property_r dmr_imp(vector <real> x1 ,
13 vector <real> x2 ,
14 vector <real> spec_x) :
15 (x1<r> == x2 <r>) -> (x1<r> == spec_x);
16
17 r_requires eq(N) && eq(M) && eq(F) && eq(A)
18 vector <real> ss_cg(uint N,
19 uint M,
20 uint F,
21 matrix <real> A(N, N),
22 vector <real> b(N),
23 vector <real> x(N))
24 {
25 vector <real > r(N), p(N), q(N), next_x(N), next_r(N), next_p(N)
26 real alpha , beta , tmp , tmp2 , num , denom;
27 uint man_mod;
28
29 vector <real > zeros(N);
30 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i) { zeros[i] = 0 };
58
31
32 uint it = 0;
33
34 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
35 {
36 tmp = 0;
37 @noinf for (uint j = 0 ; j < N; ++j)
38 {
39 tmp = tmp + A[i][j] * x[i];
40 }
41 r[i] = b[i] - tmp;
42 }
43 p = r;
44
45 @noinf @label( outer_while )
46 while (it < M)
47 invariant_r eq(A) && eq(it) && eq(M) &&
48 eq(N) && eq(man_mod) && eq(F)
49 {
50 if (man_mod == F)
51 {
52 vector <real> r2(N), q2(N);
53 specvar vector <real > spec_r(N), spec_q(N);
54
55 r = r2 = spec_r = q = q2 = spec_q = zeros;
56 bool not_run = true;
57 @noinf while (not_run || r != r2 || q != q2)
58 invariant_r dmr_eq(r, r2, spec_r)
59 invariant_r dmr_eq(q, q2, spec_q)
60 invariant_r dmr_imp(r, r2, spec_r)
61 invariant_r dmr_imp(q, q2, spec_q)
62 {
63 not_run = false;
64
65 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
66 {
67 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j)
68 {
69 tmp = A[i][j] *. x[j];
70 tmp2 = A[i][j] *. x[j];
71 specvar real spec_tmp = A[i][j] * x[j];
72 r[i] = r[i] +. tmp;
73 r2[i] = r2[i] +. tmp2;
74 spec_r[i] = spec_r[i] + spec_tmp;
75
76 tmp = A[i][j] *. p[j];
77 tmp2 = A[i][j] *. p[j];
78 spec_tmp = A[i][j] * p[j];
79 q[i] = q[i] +. tmp;
80 q2[i] = q2[i] +. tmp2;
81 spec_q[i] = spec_q[i] + spec_tmp;
82 }
83 }
84 }
85
86 assert_r (! outer_while [model.upset] -> r<r> == spec_r);
87 assert_r (! outer_while [model.upset] -> q<r> == spec_q);
88
89 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i) { r[i] = b[i] - r[i]; }
90
91 num = 0;
92 denom = 0;
93 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
94 {
95 tmp = r[i] * p[i];
96 num = num + tmp;
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97 tmp = p[i] * q[i];
98 denom = denom + tmp;
99 }
100 alpha = num / denom;
101
102 @noinf for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
103 {
104 tmp = alpha * p[i];
105 next_x[i] = x[i] + tmp;
106 tmp = alpha * q[i];
107 next_r[i] = r[i] - tmp;
108 }
109
110 num = 0;
111 denom = 0;
112 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
113 {
114 tmp = -next_r[i];
115 tmp = tmp * q[i];
116 num = num + tmp;
117
118 tmp = p[i] * q[i];
119 denom = denom + tmp;
120 }
121 beta = num / denom;
122
123 @noinf for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
124 {
125 tmp = beta * p[i];
126 next_p[i] = next_r[i] + tmp;
127 }
128 } else {
129 for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
130 {
131 q[i] = 0;
132 @label( inner_err)
133 for (uint j = 0; j < N; ++j)
134 invariant_r (model.upset == false && eq(p)) ->
135 q<r>[i<r>] == q<o>[i<o>]
136 {
137 tmp = A[i][j] *. p[j];
138 q[i] = q[i] +. tmp;
139
140 assert_r ((! inner_err[model.upset] && eq(p)) -> sqr_lt(q, i));
141 }
142 }
143
144 num = 0;
145 denom = 0;
146 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
147 {
148 tmp = r[i] * r[i];
149 num = num + tmp;
150 tmp = p[i] * q[i];
151 denom = denom + tmp;
152 }
153 alpha = num / denom;
154
155 @noinf for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
156 {
157 tmp = alpha * p[i];
158 next_x[i] = x[i] + tmp;
159 tmp = alpha * q[i];
160 next_r[i] = r[i] - tmp;
161 }
162
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163 num = 0;
164 denom = 0;
165 @noinf for (uint i = 0; i < N; ++i)
166 {
167 tmp = next_r[i] * next_r[i];
168 num = num + tmp;
169 tmp = r[i] * r[i];
170 denom = denom + tmp;
171 }
172 beta = num / denom;
173
174 @noinf for (i = 0; i < N; ++i)
175 {
176 tmp = beta * p[i];
177 next_p[i] = next_r[i] + tmp;
178 }
179 }
180 ++it;
181
182 p = next_p;
183 x = next_x;
184 r = next_r;
185
186
187 ++man_mod;
188
189 if (man_mod == M)
190 {
191 man_mod = 0;
192 }
193 }
194 return x;
195 }
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